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Chapter 1:
Introduction to  
the Hero and  
Criteria of a 
Villain 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Throughout the centuries of human civilization, the notion of the self-sacrificing hero has 
evolved in parallel to the evolution of societies.  Heroes are shaped by their creators—the 
populace of a society—in regards to the ideals that society wishes to uphold.  A hero is a person 
who represents the greatest aspects of human beings, epitomizing the characteristics that society 
holds most dear.  These characteristics have transitioned in their levels of importance over time, 
shifting the “ideal” self-sacrificing hero from one figure to another.  However, as these 
transitions occur, inevitable discrepancies will evolve in the varying minds of the participants in 
society.  Those who wish to value one attribute above another will disagree with another‟s 
archetype of the ideal self-sacrificing hero.  Ultimately, one view will prevail in the mind of 
society itself, while the other will fall by the wayside.  This thesis has been written to contend 
that the contemporary view of the self-sacrificing hero is incomplete, and that another type of 
self-sacrifice should be recognized for its contribution to society‟s greater good.   
 The introduction portion of this thesis will explain the evolution of the heroic figure over 
the course of time.  In this process, we will examine the attributes of the hero that are most 
valued by society as the hero morphs from one form into another.  Next, we will examine the 
relationship between ethics and heroism and utilize this connection to describe the contemporary 
view of heroism through modern ethicists.  Finally, a brief overview of the rest of the thesis will 
be laid out in order to provide an understanding of the structure of the argument that some self-
sacrificing heroes sacrifice more than their lives to save their societies, and that they merit 
recognition for their contributions as well as other heroes. 
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According to Joseph Campbell, the figure of the hero has evolved throughout the 
centuries from a cosmological miracle-worker to a defiant member of society.
1
  Early heroic 
figures derived from myths that detailed their cosmological origins, whether those origins were 
the blood of a deity or a dragon.  The emperor Huang Ti, who united China and was said to have 
led his people into a golden age was supposedly conceived by starlight and could talk at the age 
of seventy days.
2
  These types of heroes—predestined from birth and endowed with supernatural 
powers—are manifest throughout numerous ancient cultures, from the Egyptian pharaohs that 
were considered descendants of the gods to the Buddha.
3
  Common folklore endowed the heroic 
figures with whatever level of miraculous origins was necessary to convince the populace of the 
hero‟s power to affect salvation.  Over time, these heroes developed more human characteristics 
that related their innate powers to those of the populace.  Stories of miraculous birth evolved into 
tales of humbler beginnings, such as the infant abandoned by a fearful mother,
4
 or the child 
sovereign sent into exile by jealous competitors;
5
 these heroes would later return to society and 
utilize their innate powers to transform the world around them.  These progressive myths 
contributed to the perspective of a hero as merely a human being, but still a human being with 
superhuman capabilities.  Though these abilities were the product of the hero‟s destiny, the hero 
had nonetheless to overcome the same obstacles and trials as everyday people in order to gain 
these gifts through merit rather than miracles.
6
 
Incidentally, this notion of striving to attain greatness later inspired the notion that any 
human being can become a hero with enough dedication.  In attaining these new capabilities that 
render the hero powerful in the face of a society, the hero enters a period of obscurity, separated 
from society by her talents.
7
  That which makes the hero supernatural leads to her being 
perceived as an unnatural being, isolating her from her own humble and human origins.  
However, through this separation and learned dedication, the hero becomes aware of her true 
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character—her autonomous self—and enters the world as a creator, a person capable of 
reshaping the world into something better than what it already is.
8
   
If the notion of society at this point was that a hero could improve the world, then 
Campbell argues that the hero must then have begun to represent a transforming force against 
conservative practices.  As he phrases it, “The mythological hero is the champion not of things 
become but of things becoming; the dragon to be slain by him is precisely the monster of the 
status quo:  Holdfast, keeper of the past.”9  Therefore, a hero‟s role became to transform society, 
to unite the present world with the ideal world the hero hoped to attain.  The enemy of an ideal 
world is consistency—generation-to-generation monotony in a systemic structure—and the hero 
became the agent of change.  As an individual who was isolated from society by predestination 
or by meritorious effort, the hero capably defined his own character apart from the society from 
which he was born.  This introspect rendered the hero with an additional capability beyond those 
attained through years of separation and training:  the ability to view society from an outside 
perspective and judge it objectively so as to redefine it for the betterment of all within that 
society.  A hero, thus, by definition should instigate change, but whether predestined or 
dedicated to a higher cause, the heroic figure nonetheless maintained supernatural powers to 
become that transforming force.  Later however, the heroic figure evolved in the minds of his 
creators once again, this time to encompass the possibility that any living person is capable of 
being a hero. 
Campbell contends that the modern view of a heroic figure is that of a woman who, 
although she lacks any supernatural powers, maintains the perspective of a heroic figure—she 
can judge society objectively from an outside perspective and initiate change for the better.
 10
  
Regardless of the idealistic origins and practices of a society, that society can always be 
transformed into something more.  This notion guides the hopes of countless individuals who 
believe in a brighter future, and gives life to the need for an agent of change:  the hero.  The 
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enemy of society then, as Campbell has already suggested, is Holdfast—the dragon of perpetuity, 
unwilling to release traditions of the past for the sake of an uncertain future.  These “keepers of 
the past” are found in modern times; they are “namely the patriots whose ubiquitous 
photographs, draped with flags, serve as official icons”11.  Those members of society who insist 
that their society is a manifestation of the „best‟ society that exists, are precisely the hindrance to 
attaining an ideal society.  Thus, these agents of conservation become monsters in the 
mythological sense, and the role of the hero is to destroy their strength as retainers of the past, 
bringing to light a greater future.
12
  This type of heroism requires no supernatural birth or 
powers.  Normal individuals with autonomy, an individual perspective to step outside of society 
and judge its deficiencies, and the willingness to heed this call are what Campbell would deem to 
be “modern heroes.”13  They represent the voices calling out the wrongs of society in the face of 
oppression, and risk their reputations, sometimes even their lives, for the pursuit of a greater 
good.  The hero then, has transformed over the course of several centuries from a divine force, to 
a dedicated being who attains supernatural abilities, to an autonomous individual with the 
perspective and desire to make the world a better place. Modern philosophers emphasize the 
latter portion of these requirements to define modern heroes, essentially demonstrating that a 
typical person, in order to be worthy of heroism, must demonstrate qualities of ethics and act as 
an ethical human being. 
Heroism is acting on behalf of others in such a way as to benefit them in ways that they 
cannot benefit themselves.  Thus, the notion of heroism is inherently dependent on the 
interrelatedness of people within a society, and therefore is dependent on a notion of ethics.  
Ethics is a method of interrelationships between individuals.  Those individuals with ethics of 
goodness place the needs of other before themselves because they are capable of rendering a 
service to others so long as they resort to selflessness first.  Thus, an ethical person, in essence is 
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a hero, because an ethical person acts benevolently towards another person for the sake of 
helping them in a way that the second person could not help his or her self.     
Emmanuel Levinas defines ethical interactions through relationships between different 
people.  The entire essence of what is “ethical” is derived from each individual‟s sense of the 
“other”—those individuals separate from oneself that give rise to the notion of “self” as an 
independent entity.  If the “other” did not exist, then we would have no self-awareness, because 
there would be no “self.”  Human beings require an awareness of something separate from 
themselves with which their independent mind can be compared in order to comprehend even the 
concept of what is a “self.”14  Therefore, because the “other” is the partly responsible for our 
self-awareness, the “other” should be treated with as much respect and dignity as our own 
personal creator, because the “other” is the creator of the self.  Levinas therefore, contends that 
the greatest good is striving for the betterment of the “other,” because the “other” defines our 
universe.  The essence of a hero then, in Levinas‟ view, is that of a person who is constantly in a 
state of giving rather than receiving, of focusing on the “other” rather than the self, thereby 
demonstrating selflessness.  Levinas contends that whereas the golden rule says that we should 
do unto others as we would have them do unto us, we should actually “do unto others as they 
would have us do unto them.”15  The role of the hero, as an ethical human being, is to promote 
the greater good for the “other,” indicating that a hero plays a completely selfless role in acting 
on behalf of society.  Such selflessness places the burden of suffering on the ethical person, 
which Agnes Heller advocates as a key feature of ethics. 
Heller defines an ethical human being as one who prefers “suffering injustice (being 
wronged) to committing injustice (doing wrong).”16  Advocating the same notion of the self as a 
less important entity than the other, Heller believes that ethical people act on behalf of their 
community to fight injustice, if not by opposing injustice, then at least by enduring its oppression 
rather than contribution to it.
17
  A hero can be a victim just as much as a normal citizen, but the 
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hero commits an essence of self-sacrifice to the cause of justice, refusing to do harm unto others, 
and in turn accepting the harms that others would yield unto him.  Even if he is not a powerful 
figure, a man can still be heroic as a victim by confronting his (and others‟) oppressor. 
Paulo Freire emphasizes this role of an ethical person as one who defies oppression from 
a weaker position.  He also believes, like Heller, that ethical human beings must take a stance on 
their notions of justice, but he takes this argument a step further, indicating that the role of an 
autonomous individual within society, as an ethical individual, is to “challenge and question” 
authority figures.
18
  Freire maintains that each individual‟s critical perspective is absolutely 
necessary to promoting the greater good, and that these individuals have a responsibility to stand 
up against injustice.
19
  Institutions, he argues, are inherently damaging and oppressive, because 
they advocate a single perspective rather than the myriad of perspectives represented by the 
individuals they consist of.
20
  An ethical individual should act against oppression, therefore, an 
ethical individual acting as a hero, according to Freire, should constantly criticize and oppose 
institutions in an effort to enhance the voice of the individual.  A hero should not only avoid 
oppressing others, but should stand up to the oppressors within an institution in society.  The role 
of the hero in this instance relies on her ability to stand out amidst the other members of society, 
and to influence change therein for the benefit of others. 
Renowned philosopher Michel Foucault emphasizes the importance of individuality 
within a society and the hegemony associated with the development of institutions.  Ethical 
human beings, as argued by Levinas, act on behalf of others.  Foucault indicates that this is 
possible only through the recognition of the autonomous self.
21
  To reach the level of 
individuality necessary to act against institutions, a person must first be able to determine what is 
“individual” about herself.  The next step then, in beginning to interact on behalf of others, is to 
renounce this “self” that has been discovered.  Renunciation of the “self” acknowledges Levinas‟ 
“other” as more important, thereby defining an ethical interaction between two people.  Whereas 
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Levinas emphasizes the importance of one individual never claiming to “know” another,22 
Foucault claims that individuals should not permit systems of thought to manufacture individuals 
through definition of what is “normal.”23  Political and historical institutions of thought claim to 
know what is true and what is right,
24
 but according to Foucault, “Universal truth and general 
right are illusions and traps.”25  Regardless of how perfect a system appears to be, the power 
structure of a society inevitably omits the needs of its less powerful citizens.  This type of 
oppression must be overcome by the individuals capable of impressing their notions of “self” 
onto society, acknowledging the value of individuals even in a consistent power structure.  
Furthermore, because the “other” is more important than the individual herself, these 
autonomous thinkers have a responsibility to stand up against systems of thought in order to give 
voice to the powerless.  This movement is not necessarily political or legal, but rather cultural.
26
  
A hero in society must work towards cultural revolution for the benefit of the powerless.   
Clearly, contemporary views of heroism inherently rely on a basic understanding of 
ethics whereby heroes in society are those who place others above themselves, but beyond that, 
they strive to improve the entire society around them for the benefit of all.  This connotation 
includes a hint of self-sacrifice, indicating that a hero holds the lives of others above his own, as 
well as the good of the society itself.  Such views describe the heroism of real individuals such as 
Oscar Schindler, as well as fictional heroes like Superman.  However, I would contend that while 
these contemporary views of self-sacrificing heroes encompass broad elements of absolute 
heroism, they also lack a key understanding of self-sacrifice that can be used to define an entirely 
different type of hero:  the hero who cares so deeply for his society that he willingly embraces 
the role of the villain for the sake of the greater good.  Contemporary heroes are respected for 
sacrifice of life, liberty, and happiness, but what of the hero who is willing to sacrifice his soul? 
If the conception of one‟s “self” extends beyond the physical, then absolute sacrifice of the “self” 
would be the sacrifice of the very essence of one‟s morality.  Levinas argues that the very 
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definition of “self” begins with ethics, therefore, to eliminate oneself at the very core, one would 
necessarily have to sacrifice his ethics for the benefit of others.  Therefore, the intention of this 
thesis is to argue that contemporary views of self-sacrificing heroes are incomplete.  These views 
should be expanded to acknowledge the hero whose sacrifice is so complete that he ceases to 
become a hero and instead becomes a villain.   
This thesis will demonstrate the importance of the ultimately “self”-sacrificing hero using 
a variety of methods.  First, we will examine the role of institutions and power structures within 
society and their effects on cultural understanding.  Foucault asserts that power structures lead to 
the oppression of individuals through a process of normalization, which is called hegemony.  
Hegemony exists within every power structure, regardless of its design or intentions.  The mere 
construction of a system of thought, a system of ideas, or a system of government requires the 
definition of normality.  Normality, by definition, must exclude certain individuals, or more 
likely, groups of individuals from consideration of what it means to be “normal,” because a 
definition, no matter how flexible, imposes boundaries on the notion of normality and prevents it 
from extending to certain groups of people.  For example, Foucault uses the example of mental 
institutions, which house individuals whose mental status or behaviors deviate from what is 
deemed to be within the confines of “normal.”27  The only criterion that separates the “normal” 
from the “abnormal” is the dominant perception of what the word, “normal” signifies.  Thus, 
mental illness and abnormality are not objective states of being, but rather social constructions of 
the human mind used to draw a line between one individual and another.   
The second portion of this thesis will involve the discovery of the individual “self” and 
how that discovery leads to the creation of an autonomous hero.  By defining what is “normal” 
within a society, systems oppress the individuals that do not meet the criteria of normality, but 
the nature of hegemony is such that even those who are being oppressed do not recognize the 
source of their subjugation. Thus, to break the pattern of conformity with an oppressive system, 
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an individual must become autonomous from the system of thought into which she was born.  
She gains autonomy through recognition of the part of her self that is independent of society‟s 
influence—the part that does not judge “normality” per se, based on socially constructed 
definitions.  Rather than depend on social constructions to define states of being, the individual 
adopts an independent conception of these states and thus frees herself from the confines of rigid 
social definitions.  This frees the individual to pursue her own reasoning of abstract ideas such as 
justice, heroism, and love, creating a new perspective through which she participates in society.  
However, upon this realization of autonomy and its accompanying unique perspective also 
generates a previously non-existent rift between the individual and the society from which she 
came, because upon realizing this autonomy, the individual recognizes that complete adherence 
to the societal norms is incompatible with complete expression of the self.  Societal norms 
require an individual to utilize the socially constructed definitions of abstract ideas in order to 
live in concordance with the rules and regulations that have been generated from the common 
understanding of those definitions.  When the individual begins to utilize her own definitions, her 
notions of abstract ideas inevitably clash with those of the system.  Hence, the newly born “hero” 
recognizes that any system used to define normality is inherently flawed, because it does not 
account for the unique aspects of individuality and the value of every individual, including those 
who do not meet the social definition of what is “normal.”  Thus, in this section we begin to 
define a hero as a person who recognizes her own individuality and willingly steps outside of the 
“normal” realms of perception in order to transgress the constraints of socially constructed 
definitions.  A self-sacrificing hero steps outside of the systemic “box” of thought in order to 
evaluate the integrity of that structure from a new perspective.  The autonomous perspective 
however, is not enough.  As Heller, Freire, Levinas and Foucault suggest, heroism also contains 
a strong element of selflessness, whereby an individual uses her new perspective for the 
betterment of others.  Foucault indicates that upon the final realization of the autonomous self, 
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the individual then chooses to renounce this self in favor of the others within society.  As a self-
aware individual who views the flaws within a society because she has an autonomous 
perspective, the ethical hero has a responsibility to then confront the system in order to instigate 
change within it.   
The third portion of this thesis will be devoted to the notion that the type of self-
sacrificing hero described herein not only exists, but must become the enemy of the society 
which he is trying to reform if he is to truly serve the role of a hero.  There are numerous 
historical examples of individuals who have sacrificed their lives and reputations for the good of 
society, such as Martin Luther and Qin Chi Huang Ti, but there are also numerous fictional 
examples that are relevant to this study, including Nietzsche‟s Zarathustra, Dostoevsky‟s Grand 
Inquisitor, and Unamuno‟s San Manuel Bueno.  Philosopher Richard Rorty contends that 
fictional archetypes of people who exhibit cruelty help us as readers to examine the effects of our 
actions on others through institutions as well as personal interactions.  As an example, he cites 
the reader‟s relationship with Mr. Causaubon in Middlemarch, or with Mrs. Jellyby in Bleak 
House.  In both instances, the reader becomes more aware of the effects of actions done unto 
others through sympathy with the central characters.
28
  Thus, Rorty maintains that fictional 
examples of autonomous people are just as relevant as historical examples to the examination of 
the human perspective.  Since the type of hero defined in this thesis necessarily implicates the 
autonomous person, this thesis adopts the same notions of non-fiction and fiction and applies it 
to the concept of a self-sacrificing hero.  By Rorty‟s examples, we can legitimately contend that 
Martin Luther‟s historical self-sacrifice is just as relevant as the Grand Inquisitor‟s fictional self-
sacrifice, and both are equal in validity to the story of Socrates, whose self-sacrifice falls 
somewhere between the lines of history and fiction.   
Up to this point we have demonstrated that upon the realization of autonomy from 
society, the individual has a moral responsibility to challenge the practices of the existing system 
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in order to reform it, but now our purpose is to demonstrate that this self-sacrificing hero cannot 
accomplish this task without becoming the enemy of his society—the “villain” in the perceptions 
of the populace.  Thus, this portion of the thesis will demonstrate that the nature of hegemony is 
to subjugate the individuality of the populace and its leaders, and to maintain this oppression 
through the systemic establishment of norms.  This systematic approach towards normalization 
blinds oppressors and oppressed alike to recognizing the suppression of individuality by 
emphasizing solidarity and faith in a system rather than a system‟s purposes.  The autonomous 
individual who adopts the role of the hero then, defies faith in this system by stepping outside of 
the “normal” realms of thought, effectively becoming an outsider within her society.  Outsiders 
are permitted within a system of oppression so long as they do not oppose the established 
guidelines of the system.  However, as we have already noted, the role of the autonomous 
individual as an ethical human being is necessarily to oppose the systems of thought that 
suppress individuality, ergo the hero of a society—one who seeks to reform it for the better—
inherently becomes an enemy of the system by nature of opposing any of its established norms.  
Those who faithfully adhere to the system‟s establishments will view the autonomous individual 
with fear and contempt, because autonomy threatens their sense of solidarity.  Similarly, the 
leaders of society will censure the autonomous hero in order to maintain their seats of power.  
Within a functional society that has defined its norms and expectations, the harbinger of change 
is a villain to be opposed and ultimately destroyed, along with her ideas, because those ideas 
threaten the solidarity of the system, and therefore endanger the order of society—from the 
perspectives of those within it.   
The final portion of this thesis will be its conclusion.  Overall, the purpose of this thesis is 
to define a new type of self-sacrificing hero who currently lacks recognition within 
contemporary views of heroism.  Current perceptions of self-sacrifice are limited to the sacrifice 
of one‟s life, one‟s happiness, or one‟s livelihood; the hero who relinquishes his reputation and 
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even his soul is still viewed as a villain until many years after he has truly brought about reform.  
This thesis proposes that self-sacrificing heroes are those who willingly challenge the norms of 
systemic thought to embrace change for the better within a society, and that these heroes should 
be recognized as heroes, rather than as „enemies of the system‟ or „criminals,‟ as they are often 
labeled by the societies they ultimately transform for the better.  Thus, in the conclusion we will 
revisit the contemporary views of heroism and compare them to the realizations we have come 
across in the course of examining the role of hegemony in society, the importance of defining a 
notion of the “self” to overcome this form of cultural oppression, and the examples of such 
“self”-sacrificing heroes that exist in historical and literary examples.  Ultimately, we should 
conclude that some individuals who are perceived as “villainous” in contemporary terms ought 
to be considered heroes for their efforts to transform the world around them for the greater good. 
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Hegemony is defined as “the spontaneous consent given by great masses of the population 
to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group.”29  The 
dominant group that forms the power structure of a society inherently defines its values of what is 
„normal or „acceptable,‟ but whether it works by active coercion or subliminal communication, 
hegemony itself is a term of domination over the human intellect.
30
  Processes of defining 
normality occur in daily interactions between individuals, but the perceptions of these individuals 
are shaped by the definitions of the dominant group—the group within a society that has the most 
influential power.  This group of dominant individuals utilizes these definitions—whether 
intentionally or unintentionally—to reinforce the social hierarchy and maintain these individuals‟ 
dominant status.
31
  Thus, processes of normalization involve the transfer of concepts of „normal‟ 
and „acceptable‟ behavior from dominant power structures to everyday communication.   
 Agnew explains that hegemony has been used in the past to refer to the structure of a 
dominating empire—an oppressive regime that maintains its standards of normality and rules 
through coercion.
32
  Dominant power structures that dictate normality via coercion rarely stand for 
long, as the general populace is likely to disagree with the structure‟s definition of what is 
„acceptable‟ within a society because of the inherent feeling of being oppressed.  Individuals 
living under a dictatorship are not permitted to express their personal views; instead their views 
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are imposed upon them, drawing a natural disconnect between the individual and the perspective 
they are supposed to have—according to the regime.  Those who do not—or are not allowed to—
form their own views or express their own perceptions of what is „right‟ within a society, or what 
is „good‟ never have to engage the topics at hand, thus it is easier to say that rather than having 
their views expressed for them, they have no views at all—their perspectives are merely 
represented by the dominant power structure, and falsely represented, at that.  The individuals hold 
no views of their own because they are discouraged from doing so.  Ergo, what follows from this 
process is an apathetic populace that does not engage philosophical notions of what is „right,‟ what 
is „good,‟ what is „normal,‟ etc.  Instead, individuals within this dictatorial society repeat 
monotonously the mantras of the regime, never fully comprehending what the values are that they 
are supposed to be preaching, much less understanding how to defend those values to criticism 
from the outside world.   
 Individuals under the oppressive form of hegemony of which Agnew speaks represent the 
shells of their philosophies.  Coercive hegemony compels individuals to detach themselves from 
the thought process involved in defining abstract concepts and instead encourages robotic 
repetition of definitions of which the subjects cannot grasp the meaning because they have no 
direct connection to the definition—merely a phrase that is to be spoken, and never to be 
comprehended.  Such a type of hegemony is insipid, to be sure, but not so dangerous as more 
subtle types of sublimation.  Coercive hegemony, while compelling, does not reach the 
subconscious levels of individual mindset, and therefore exists only as long as the dominant power 
structure that creates it.  In a society where individuals are discouraged from autonomous thought, 
their closest connection to their personal values extends only so far as the depth of their 
entrenchment within the power structure; most individuals therefore, have no more belief in the 
values imposed upon them than outsiders—they merely follow the rules and speak the words they 
are supposed to without understanding their meaning.  Therefore, when the power structure falls to 
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outside influences, the hegemonic ideals that it sustained cease to exist, for there is no one 
competent left to defend them.   
 Coercive hegemony is well portrayed in the film V for Vendetta.  Recovering from an 
apocalyptic era, the citizens of London live under the commanding regime of High Chancellor 
Adam Sutler.  When a deadly and contagious virus broke out in Britain, Sutler assumed the mantle 
of leadership and used his influence to diminish the power of individuals within the society and 
thus further augment his own.  With the full force of the military behind him, Sutler restricts the 
freedoms of Londoners by instituting random surveillance to monitor citizens‟ dedication to his 
regime‟s cause, by heavily censoring the media for messages that run counter to the regime‟s 
purposes, and by arresting any members of the public who question his authority or the authority 
of his representatives, such as his elite police division called “fingermen.”  This type of 
domination by power forces the people of London to submit to Sutler‟s views by preventing them 
from dissenting and also encouraging them to voice their thoughts in favor of Sutler‟s regime—
lest the random surveillances and fingermen repeat that the individual has not demonstrated 
significant favor of the regime and therefore must oppose it.  Sutler holds the power to execute at 
will, therefore anyone whom he deems to be opposed to him is subsequently eliminated.  In 
response, the people of London post signs emphasizing Sutler‟s motto:  “Strength through unity, 
unity through faith,” and submit to any demands made by those in power, for those in power hold 
the power to kill.   
This coercive hegemony, while powerful, lacks somewhat in substance, in that it oppresses 
the majority of a society‟s population, encouraging widespread internal dissent because anyone 
who is not a part of the dominant power structure is not free to express their personal views.  
Individuals outwardly ascribe to the demands of the dominant power structure, as the Londoners 
of V for Vendetta ascribe to Sutler, but in the end when revolution is called for, nearly every 
person in the city shows up to counter the visible power of Sutler‟s regime.  The individuals who 
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harbor internal resentment of their own oppression manifest their protest in the form of a 
demonstration that changes, we led are to assume, the entire power structure of London for many 
years to come.  Thus, the external public assent, while it is influential in leading to further 
entrenchment of Sutler‟s power, is insignificant when compared with the genuine values that the 
people of London hold in their hearts.  Coercive hegemony functions, but only so long as the 
dominant power structure stands.  When Sutler and his highest commanders are eliminated, the 
people of London rise up, demonstrating that coercive hegemony is not so great a force as the 
willpower of the people.   
 The other type of hegemony however, the more subtle version which Agnew discusses, is 
far more insidious because it turns this willpower of the people into the very oppressive force that 
those who are being oppressed ought to resent.  Subtle hegemony is based on what Agnew refers 
to as, “soft power.”  This type of power is not coercive, but rather influential, using social 
constructs to augment the influence of the dominant power structure.  This subtle hegemony 
pervades the perceptions of a society through social influences.  By defining what is „good,‟ 
„right,‟ or „normal‟ within a society, the dominant power structure encourages individuals‟ thought 
processes to work in accordance with those definitions.  These classifications are not imposed on 
the populace by coerciveness, but rather utilized tacitly within cultural communication such as the 
media.  The media, therefore, has the power to define normality by ridiculing that which lies 
outside of the dominant power structure‟s definition of „normal,‟ or by praising that which 
encompasses that very definition, establishing the „rules of right.‟  Such political sway need not be 
obvious, for merely in presenting the news stories about one side of an issue and not presenting 
stories about the other side, the media encourages perception in favor of the former.  This type of 
hegemony inevitably leads to the oppression of individuals—or more likely, groups of 
individuals—by excluding them from the „normal‟ category.  In defining what is normal, the 
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dominant power structure establishes what is „not normal,‟ and abnormality, as a concept, links to 
negative connotations because it is perceived as that which is outside of society‟s preferences.   
Brenda Allen notes that dominant groups control the ideologies within a society, and over 
time, these ideologies disseminate into everyday language, “become taken for granted and 
accepted as universally valid by most members of a society.”33  Such blind acceptance of 
established norms disguises the potentially oppressive nature of these practices.  Allen says 
further: 
[Rules of right] guide and regularize our interactions with others, and they help to maintain 
power positions.  Members of society and organizations routinely and robotically invoke 
rules of right with statements or sentiments such as „that‟s the way we do things around 
here,‟ „these are the standard procedures,‟ or „it‟s just common sense.‟34 
 
This “common sense” logic pervades the thoughts of every individual and interrupts the normal 
continuum of their independent responses.  Even individuals that think autonomously from the 
societal power structures still identify with the central values of the society to which they ascribe 
themselves, so they contribute to this soft power by ingraining the values of the dominant power 
structure into their own thought processes.  Further, they neglect to recognize the source of these 
responses—society itself—by connecting the thoughts to such asinine platitudes as “common 
sense,” ignoring the powerful influence of social pressures and dominion through normalization.  
Thus, groups of individuals are inherently oppressed by whatever definition of normality is laid 
out by the dominant power structures within a society.  This oppression, while inevitable, also 
lacks recognition, making it more dangerous to those who are being oppressed.  As Freire 
explains, those who oppress others—whether consciously as in coercive hegemony, or 
unconsciously as in the use of “soft power”—lack the strength or ability to recognize their 
oppressive actions, therefore, the oppressed must rise up against the social order that is oppressing 
them.
35
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The more subtle hegemony, Agnew explains, is more insipid than the coercive form, for 
the members of society ascribe to it almost at thoughtlessly as those under an oppressive regime, 
but even more dangerous, they actually take the values of the dominant power structure to heart 
and assemble it as part of their own value system.  Individuals that perceive themselves as 
“functioning members of society” value the society for its solidarity and therefore submit to its 
most fundamental tenements so as to acknowledge that they are a part of that solidarity.  Society 
imposes the perception of what is „right,‟ and what is „normal,‟ such that individuals begin to 
perceive righteousness and normality within these contexts and ascribe their reasoning to 
“common sense” logic.  Agnew says, “Hegemony is absolutely not equivalent to simple 
domination (territorial or otherwise) but refers to widespread assent to principles of conduct that 
are the „common sense.‟”36  The people give assent to relinquishing their power as individuals by 
believing that common sense dictates that they should, because they work in solidarity with 
society, and society demands centralization of power. 
In Dostoevsky‟s The Grand Inquisitor, Christian followers do not question the cardinal‟s 
authority, even when he arrests Jesus Christ, because their faith does not ascribe to Jesus Himself, 
but rather to the sense of solidarity that the Church under Jesus Christ has come to represent.  
They believe that it is wrong to question those who speak for the Church, because they have 
willingly submitted themselves to a “higher power,” which initially was God, but has been twisted 
through subtle definition to also be interpreted as the Church.  Such subliminal manipulation of 
the understanding of the masses of people that surrender their personal values to that of the 
dominant power structure is exactly the type of subtle hegemony that Agnew warns us about.  In 
permitting their beliefs and surrender to Jesus Christ to be misconstrued into believing in and 
surrendering to the values of the Church, Christian followers in The Grand Inquisitor give silent 
acquiescence to the antithesis of their original beliefs.  Through internalizing the Christian 
teachings of submission, and allowing this submission to influence their own values, Christian 
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followers unintentionally yield the Grand Inquisitor more power than Christ.  As Agnew suggests, 
this hegemony is far more dangerous than coercive hegemony because the people within the 
society do not realize that they are even yielding power to someone else.  Worse, the citizens 
perpetuate the oppressive hegemonies that they take part in by permitting those ideologies to guide 
their thoughts and behaviors.
37
 
Unfortunately, the subtle form of hegemony that is demonstrated in The Grand Inquisitor 
and occurs in a variety of ways in every society, not just societies that are dominated by powerful 
political figures like the Grand Inquisitor.  Even societies that do not intentionally create 
oppression for any of their citizens must inevitably do so when they begin to form laws and 
regulations, for the society justifies those constraints on human actions through moral arguments.  
The society ascribes to a specific set of moral guidelines by which all members are expected to 
abide, and these guidelines themselves derive from the dominant power structure, whether that 
structure is a dictatorship with one person at its head determining the rules by which all others are 
governed, or whether that structure is a democracy with a majority at its head determining the 
guidelines by which all citizens—even the minorities not represented in this instance—are to be 
governed.  In any case, the dominant power will inevitably oppress the non-dominant powers by 
electing to govern in a way that favors those who dominate society‟s rules and leadership.  
However, as already discussed, the people who willingly submit to this system of government, 
even those who disagree with its tenements, further reinforce the dominant power by offering it 
their support because they favor the solidarity it brings over their autonomous ideals—as the 
townspeople favors obedience to the authority of the Grand Inquisitor even after recently 
witnessing the miracles of Jesus Christ and following Him.   
Subtle hegemony is dangerous because it is a form of oppression to which even the 
oppressed submit.  Out of fear of losing solidarity with others, or dedication to a cause that 
transcends the individual, he relinquishes his personal power and sense of values, electing to allow 
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the society, which theoretically represents the „greater good‟ he wishes to promote, to choose his 
values and actions for him.  The individual‟s autonomous views may in fact be in line with many 
of the society‟s values, but hegemonic influences manifest in the form of complete submission to 
the views of the dominant power.  Definitions of normality strip the unique attributes of 
individuals of their potentiality of goodness by emphasizing conformity with that which is not 
them—that which is the society‟s ideal, which no single individual can ever hope to encompass.  
Ergo, these definitions in a sense, oppress everyone within a society by separating individuals 
from their ideals and instead encourage them to live up to the impossible task of ascribing fully to 
an ideal that is not even their own.  Individuals that attempt to engender the ideal concept of 
„individuality‟ as society defines it, inevitably become frustrated by the fact that even if they 
appear to succeed, they are just like everyone else who has succeeded, and therefore not individual 
at all.   
Hegemony is suppression of individuality because it is submission of one‟s will to the will 
of the dominant power structure.  In a sense, it is a subliminal form of oppression because it is 
self-inflicted, but that does not make it any less insidious in its effects.  Even if not imposed by 
coercive dominant power structures, hegemony damages individuality by encouraging suppression 
of unique attributes within an individual.  Favoring the protective and social benefits of solidarity 
over diversity in viewpoints, citizens of a society relinquish their personal values, submitting to a 
single, unified view regardless of whether that view lies in accordance with their own being.  For 
example, in V for Vendetta, Evey‟s best interest lies in assisting V in liberating their nation from a 
tyrannical government; she even agrees that “this world is screwed up,” but when given the chance 
to help assassinate Bishop Linnamen, she instead attempts to foil V‟s plot by revealing it to the 
disinterested clergyman.  She demonstrates the social tendency to favor rejoining the masses in 
solidarity over going against the grain to bring society as a whole to a higher form of existence.  
Through manipulation of the ideals of freedom and justice, Sutler‟s regime encourages obedience, 
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and through the desire to become part of a greater whole within society, individuals such as Evey 
encourage conformity.  Within a society such as the London of V for Vendetta, individuals have 
the option of submitting their willpower wholeheartedly to the dominant power structure, as the 
unquestioning believers in Dostoevsky‟s The Grand Inquisitor, or of conforming to the norms and 
expectations of that power structure, as Evey consistently attempts to do.  In either case, 
individuals cease to function as individuals—they no longer possess an autonomous mentality to 
contribute a diverse perspective to their society, ergo they might as well be automatons—robots 
mechanically performing a designated function but lacking in the ability to change or adapt.   
The importance of change and innovation is a widely recognized economic concept—those 
industries that do not consistently improve their product eventually lose out in competitive 
markets to newer industries that produce superior products at lower costs.
38
  History has 
demonstrated similar tendencies in societies, such as the Roman Empire that could not adapt to the 
changing perceptions of the populace as they edged more towards pacifism and egalitarianism.
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Stagnation destroys societies as surely as it does industries, because it undermines human 
tendencies of creativity.  Artists exist even in the most oppressive of societies create that which 
does not already exist, thus these creative spirits assist in the evolution of the human psyche 
towards new conceptions of the abstract.  Under oppressive systems that suppress this 
individuality, there is no room for creation and thus no room for improvement, but it is in the 
nature of human beings to perceive the imperfections of their surrounding society.  Thus, 
forbidden from improving a world that they recognize as less-than-perfect, individuals feel 
smothered.  Subtle hegemony prevents these individuals from moving towards revolutionary 
tendencies, thus further entrenching their own sense of oppression.  This oppression manifests and 
endures because of hegemony, and thus hegemony becomes the source of suffering within society. 
The significance of an individual can be stripped away by hegemony through the 
dehumanization of those who do not conform with the dominant system of thought.  
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“Disabilities,” as they are termed in society, refer to abnormalities within individuals that inhibit 
their ability to function as normal individuals.  As previously discussed, the definition of 
“normality” emanates from the values of the dominant power structure, so that which is perceived 
by a society as “normal” merely reflects these values.  In modern society, paraplegia is perceived 
as a physical disability because “normal” behavior involves walking on two legs.  However, if the 
dominant power structure of society, say for instance, the majority of the population in a 
democratic nation, experiences paraplegia, then this condition ceases to become an abnormality.  
Thus, a “normal” individual is more likely to be defined as a person who moves about using a 
wheelchair, and the inability to walk on two legs ceases to become a disability.   
Similarly, mental disabilities are distinguished by mental constructions based on 
definitions of normality.  Brenda Allen discusses the effects of the DSM—Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—and explains that any person who demonstrates 
symptoms of the disorders listed in this manual “is subject to categorization and stigmatization.”40  
Further, she points out that for several decades, this manual classified homosexuality as a mental 
disorder, producing a negative social effect on countless individuals through a technique of 
normalization of heterosexuality.  Numerous mental disabilities may be interpreted differently 
according to whether they are viewed as „disorders‟ that indicate some form of dysfunctionality of 
an individual‟s mind, or as variations in perceptions or perspectives.  Schizophrenia is recognized 
as a mental illness because “normality” involves hearing only one voice inside one‟s head—one‟s 
own—, therefore hearing multiple voices demonstrates a perceived wrongness in a person‟s mind.  
Foucault discusses the fact that madness is the product of social hegemony, saying, “You know 
very well that the mad subject is not an unfree subject, and that the mentally ill person is 
constituted as a mad subject, precisely in relation to and over against the one who declares him 
mad.”41  In other words, the person who accuses another of being mad defines the concept of 
madness, and truly no madness exists except that which deviates from the perceptions of the 
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dominant power structure—in this case, the accuser.  This is not to suggest that clinical mental 
disabilities do not exist, but that perception of what constitutes a mental disability in general, is a 
social construct defined by those in the dominant role who define normality.  Thus, a Nazi-like 
regime has the power and potentiality to define those who disagree with them as „mentally ill,‟ 
because they can convince the populace through hegemonic influences that only the mentally 
incompetent would express ideals that run contrary to the regime. 
In Camus‟ The Stranger, the narrator of the story is condemned as a murderer with 
malicious intent, even though he acted in self-defense in killing a man.  The narrator is convicted 
of murder because his behavior deviates from that of the dominant norm.  The jury expects the 
narrator to admit that his actions were the result of an emotional reaction to his mother‟s death, 
which occurred earlier in the story, but upon finding that he has no emotional reaction to this 
experience whatsoever, and that he shows neither sadness nor remorse for the person whom he has 
killed, he is assumed to have had malicious intent in killing the man.  His lack of emotional 
response is his condemnation, for it deviates from the expected normal response of a decent man, 
therefore, the jury assumes that the narrator is not a decent man—rather than someone whom is 
merely different from them.   
Similar to the instance of Camus‟ narrator in The Stranger, individuals are often 
condemned of malicious intent within their societies merely for deviating from the thoughts or 
behaviors of those enforced by the dominant power structure.  Indeed, as Foucault suggests, 
deviation in thought can be interpreted as a mental disability within an individual, undermining 
that person‟s credibility in the public eye, and justifying their seclusion and confinement to 
prevent these individuals from harming others in society.  In this case, individuality is not only 
suppressed, but it is also punished.  Those who do not fit the model of the “ideal” citizen run the 
risk of being perceived as not only different, but also dangerous.   
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The irony of this situation whereby the unique individual is perceived as dangerous is, of 
course, that society is more endangered by stagnation than by revolution.  Just as inflexible Rome 
could not adapt to worldwide changes in perception, societies that prohibit freedom of thought and 
expression—new ideas—from emerging can buckle under newly emerging pressures.  Individuals 
who demonstrate diverse opinions and ideas expose societies to potential innovation, thus 
strengthening the likelihood of survival in a constantly changing world.  However, societies that 
discourage these innovative ideas commit the sin of oppression of their citizens, and in addition, 
they diminish their own ability to withstand change.  Hegemony endangers societies that preach 
freedom and justice by oppressing their own citizens, and it endangers them by putting them in a 
position to fail to adapt.  Yet, hegemony encourages the citizens of a failing society to label any 
person who perceives this downward spiral as the true “danger,” because these individuals lack 
“faith” in the system and therefore undermine it.   
Perception of individuals who question hegemonic structures as dangerous figures within a 
society is not new.  In ancient Rome, individuals who perceived that the empire was 
overstretching its resources and expanding too quickly for the government to possibly maintain 
control were denounced if they shared their opinions with the general public.  Those who thought 
the empire was heading towards ruin and destruction could not possibly believe in the empire‟s 
invincibility, and in ancient Rome, this was treason.  Societal perceptions of Rome‟s superiority 
had, at the point when the empire began to decline, started to encompass the notion of an 
indefatigable kingdom.  Through this hegemonic influence, the public was convinced that any 
person who believed that Rome could destroy itself by overstretching its resources, did not believe 
in Rome‟s strength as an empire because they did not believe that it was incapable of being 
destroyed.  The obvious error in this line of reasoning is apparent, for while an empire‟s ideals 
may be invincible, its system of government and borders will never be thus.   
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Regardless of the apparent erroneous nature of ancient Roman patriotism, such hegemony 
persists in modern nations.  For example, in the most recent war engaged by the United States, the 
justification for going to war against Afghanistan, and then Iraq, was that the United States is a 
world power capable of dominating many nations, therefore it should serve as the policing force 
that keeps terrorist nations across the globe in line.  In an effort to sustain funding and moral 
support for troops, military leaders began condemning war protesters as “unpatriotic.”  The natural 
assumption of the military has been that individuals who oppose the war must naturally oppose 
belief in their military and their government, while the truth is more likely that protesters believe 
in the role of their nation as a self-sustained democracy that has no more of a right to impose its 
system of government on other nations than Britain had on the United States upon its founding.  
Inherent danger lies in these accusatory assumptions, because the oppression of one‟s citizens 
diminishes public morale, and it allows unexpected occurrences—i.e. Rome‟s ignominious fall—
to blind-side systems of government and the countless individuals who naively submit to their 
hegemonic structures.  Thus we arrive at the role of the autonomous individual and her importance 
in reforming hegemonic societies for the greater good. 
Amidst governments that wield immeasurable control through coercive power and political 
/ hegemonic influence and thus oppress their population and endanger it to unexpected 
phenomena, the individuals who deviate from the “normal” and submissive group that follows the 
rules and expectations of the dominant power structure possess the sole ability to recognize the 
society‟s potential flaws and thus reform them before these flaws can be exploited to bring about 
the society‟s unexpected end.  Individuals whose thoughts do not depend on the pensive 
reflections and definitions of others, or at the very least, on the dominant power structure, are 
autonomous individuals.  Their ability to perceive society outside of its own definitions is an 
invaluable asset to analyzing the society from an outside perspective, thereby presenting 
alternative viewpoints and possibilities while simultaneously exposing that society‟s weaknesses 
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so that they can be strengthened to make the society better.  The role of such individuals inherently 
lies in their ability to recognize the hegemonic structures within their societies and how those 
structures are oppressive.  
Recognizing Heller‟s definition of an ethical person, it is at this point which the ethical 
autonomous individual begins to defy society‟s rules and expectations.  If every society, in 
defining normality inherently commits injustice by oppressing individuals who do not meet its 
definition of “normal,” then Heller suggests that the ethical person would defy this oppression, 
either by not taking part in oppressing others himself, or by acting exactly contrary to that system 
of oppression.  Thus, the role of the ethical autonomous individual resides in passively or actively 
contradicting the hegemonic ideals and practices of his society.  The individual that chooses to act 
contrary to the system of oppression, despite the fact that he need not do so in order to be 
considered ethical, is exactly the individual whom Campbell would define as a hero, because he 
directly pursues the greater good of his society by attempting to make it better in ways that other 
individuals—because they lack the autonomous mindset to recognize the society‟s flaws—cannot.  
This hero combats oppression within his own society while simultaneously preventing its self-
destruction, thus sustaining the society in spite of the likelihood that his perceptions and actions 
will be viewed by the dominant power structure and its hegemonic followers as inherently 
“dangerous” to that society‟s survival. 
In the process of this transition, some would argue that the hero could possibly become the 
tyrant that she seeks to destroy.  Her efforts to impose her autonomous self upon society could 
easily warp into a selfish act of oppression if she neglects the aim of betterment for those around 
her.  However, recall that Levinas‟ requirement of the heroic figure is recollection of the role of 
the „other‟ in constructing the self, and deference toward the other before the self for that very 
reason.  A hero‟s primary concern is for the other, and secondarily for the self because the other is 
the reason the self exists in the first place.  As such, escape from the hegemonic structures of 
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society necessarily implies that the heroic figure will help the other to escape from them, but never 
to unjustly impose her own hegemonic structure upon that other for selfish purposes.  Indeed, if 
the necessary evil that this heroic figure recognizes within society is the construction of 
hegemonic structures within themselves, then the hero must never so much as attempt to introduce 
a hegemonic structure into the life of the other once the other has been freed from society‟s 
constructions.   
This is not to say that hegemony is possible to completely escape.  We have already 
explained here that wherever there is an organized system of government, there is a system of 
moral values upon which it was founded, upon which the citizens rely to define their “normal” 
existence, and which is inherently oppressive.   Nonetheless, hegemony remains a dangerous 
construct by which society can destroy itself, so it is important for autonomous individuals to 
fulfill their roles as independent entities by challenging that system to move towards self-
improvement.  Despite being perceived as the “danger” towards society, the autonomous 
individual must protect society from the dangers of itself. 
The process of autonomy and exercising its influence to better all of society is a difficult 
one.  Autonomous individuals are rare within the context of society because discovering autonomy 
requires a great deal of self-reflection and a willingness to travel on unknown paths of thought 
without moral guidance from another person or system.  Even rarer is the autonomous individual 
who chooses to wear the mantle of a hero, because that type of autonomy, while deemed ethical 
and heroic by philosophers, alienates the individual from her society and thus, she does not accept 
such a station in life without knowing that in doing so, she relinquishes her former identity and 
any future attempt to assimilate once more into the dominant power structure.  As such, 
autonomous individuals who combat hegemony in an effort to live as ethical human beings and 
thus reform their societies as heroes engage in a process of self-discovery that eventually becomes 
their basis for transformation.   
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The definition of “self” is a complex process, more so when that definition must be 
constructed outside the contexts of society.  Typically, as Sartre tells us, “The other is essential to 
[our] existence, as well as to the knowledge [we] have of [our]self.”42 Individuals define their 
selves through comparison of their person to the “other.”  This “other” is the average citizen that 
one perceives as the epitome of normality—not a solitary, identifiable person, but the embodiment 
of what this person represents:  a functioning individual within the confines of a defined society.  
We have already discussed the effects of hegemonic conglomeration—the solidarity enforced by 
societal ideals that serve as the glue that molds individuals into a solitary „people‟—but now we 
must examine the perception of this singular entity from within its boundaries, that is to say, from 
the perspective of an individual within that solidified mass of others.  Comparison is the basis for 
self-definition, for it allows one to perceive the self in relation to that which is not the self.  
Nonetheless, it is not possible for an individual to compare herself to a conglomeration of others, 
ergo she must single out the attributes of what an ideal individual ought to be.  Thus, the notion of 
the „ideal citizen‟ is born.   
 Previously, we mentioned the impossibility of embodying all of the aspects of an „ideal‟ 
person, and now we will expand upon that notion.  The essence of the ideal citizen within a 
society is that this person fits the mold—the sum of expectations that society imposes upon the 
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people within it.  It may be possible for one individual to fit this mold upon society‟s foundation if 
that individual was the founder, because only the founder can hope to encompass every combined 
ideal of that society—no two individuals share the same sentiments about absolutely every aspect 
of society‟s functions.  However, any doctrine that is written in stone cannot change as the 
perceptions of people do.  It is in the nature of the person to change his perspective as he grows 
older and wiser to the workings of the world and its peoples.  However, the imposed rules of a 
society, if they cannot be modified, quickly become incompatible with even the original individual 
who created them.  In large societies, this problem becomes even more pronounced, such as in 
Camus‟ The Stranger, when a man stands on trial and is condemned for murder, not because his 
action was not done in self-defense, but because the man feels no remorse for taking the life of 
another human being.  His prosecutor admits that this man cannot be blamed for his inability to 
acquire the moral tendencies common to the other members of society, but says to the jury, “In a 
criminal court the wholly passive ideal of tolerance must give place to a sterner, loftier ideal, that 
of justice.  Especially when this lack of every decent instinct is such as that of the man before you, 
a menace to society.”43  The man on trial does not meet the hegemonic ideals of his society as far 
as what constitutes a „decent‟ person, so instead of being perceived as a member of his society, he 
is condemned by it as a „menace‟ to the foundational ideals to which all others in that society 
ascribe.  This man, who had no say in the foundational ideals of society in the first place, cannot 
hope to live up to the societal expectations of an ideal citizen.  Even if he had been more involved 
in the foundation of society, he still could not hope to meet these guidelines, because even the 
prosecutor, who represents the ideals of the people, originally attempts to vindicate the man on 
trial because he knows that he is innocent.  Yet, the prosecutor‟s perspective changes as he 
discovers the „soulless‟ nature of the man on trial, and his entire conception of „innocence‟ evolves 
from that point on.  Even secured in the foundations of his original beliefs, the prosecutor‟s 
societal perceptions change over time in such a way that he himself no longer embodies the 
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original ideals he represented, so how can a person, such as the accused man on trial, ever hope to 
represent these ideals? It is clear from this example that an individual cannot possibly meet all of 
the expectations of the ideal citizen, for even if that individual exists upon the foundation of the 
„ideal‟ model, the definition of „ideal‟ evolves in the mentality of the individual as well as the 
society, such that no person can ever hope to entirely encompass the attributes of the „ideal‟ 
citizen.  An individual self cannot exist within the contexts of society. 
 Definition of self, therefore, begins where the individual and the society clash, because it is 
at this point where the individual becomes distinct from the mass of others that comprise the 
society.  The similarities between this individual and the ideal citizen are what contribute to her 
perception of solidarity with others as a member of the same system of thought.  In contrast, the 
variations between this individual and others distinguish her from the ideal citizen, and thus the 
society of which she feels she is a part.  Societies that encourage diversity emphasize the positive 
aspects of individuality and differences that distinguish between one citizen and another, thus 
creating the notion that partial separation from the ideal citizen is not a negative attribute.  Ergo, it 
is possible for individuals to perceive their uniqueness in a positive light, which ultimately 
enforces processes of social innovation through diversity in perspective. 
 William James argues, “There can be no final truth […] until the last man has had his 
experience and said his say.  […] However, the hypotheses which we now make while waiting, 
and the acts to which they prompt us, are among the indispensable conditions which determine 
what that „say‟ shall be.”44  Every individual perspective matters because each perspective 
contributes to the overall perception of truth.  If truth can be discovered through universal 
knowledge, then everything that each individual knows is part of this conglomeration of truth.  
James contends that each perception is an „indispensable hypothesis‟ of truth, and so to find 
ultimate truth, we must acknowledge and test every hypothesis.  Individuals that contribute unique 
perspectives are instigators of social change because they influence the opinion of the dominant 
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norm in that they present an opposing view.  To present this view is to introduce a new method of 
observation of circumstances previously unavailable to others because they could not recognize 
the circumstances outside of their own experiences.  Thus, the individual presents a new reality to 
the conglomerate “other” and influences social change through alteration of perception.  Without 
this individual‟s perspective, the other would have no concept of a different situation from that 
which already exists, thus change would never take place.  However, upon the introduction of this 
altered perception, the other then has the potentiality of recognizing various viewpoints and 
adopting one that previously did not exist. 
 In order for an individual to adopt a perspective that varies from that of the dominant 
norm, it is necessary for that individual to first attain autonomy from the current system of 
thought.  Comparison of oneself to the ideal citizen is merely the beginning of realization of one‟s 
perceived separateness from the conglomerate society, but regardless, it is a critical first step.  
Perceiving oneself as different from the expectation is vital to understanding one‟s role and 
significance as an individual because it alienates the individual from the sum of norms that 
diminish the individual identities of all others.  By recognizing that he is different from all others, 
an individual thus acknowledges that he is.  Such recognition is the realization of existence, not as 
part of a larger whole that is society, but as an entire whole within oneself who contributes to a 
larger entity that is comprised of many individuals that are themselves whole.  This is William 
James‟ theory at work, for just as each individual perspective comprises part of the larger notion 
of truth, the mere existence of every individual comprises the entirety of the existence of society.  
As Levinas declares, recognition of the “other” allows for recognition of the self, ergo the 
existence of the self is entirely dependent upon the “other.” 
 In order to escape one‟s identity as part of a greater mass and instead define oneself as an 
autonomous individual, it is necessary to first escape the realms of categorizations and perceptions 
that are used to define individuals within the context of a society that diminishes their 
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individuality.  Some would contend that this process begins with language, others that it begins 
with person-to-person interactions, or perhaps visual associations.  Regardless of the precise 
method of the beginning of this process, the important aspect of it is the realization that the 
definition of self naturally occurs within the context of societal perception, ergo it is dependent 
upon a system of thought rather than one‟s self—we cannot define ourselves by ourselves until we 
have first defined our self through society.  This demonstrates an inherent problem with the notion 
of autonomy, for it is impossible to define the self independently of a system that oppresses the 
individual.  However, as we have previously noted, the key portion of this process is recognition.  
By defining the self within the contexts of society and using definitions limited by societal 
perceptions to recognize the key differences that distinguish the individual from others, including 
the ideal citizen that embodies society‟s preferred characteristics, the individual realizes a self 
apart from society, some aspect of her independent being that transcends societal boundaries by 
varying from the dominant norm.   
 Recognition of a single, distinguishable entity outside of the contexts of society creates the 
notion of an autonomous self, but true autonomy derives from what follows this critical 
realization.  “Inasmuch as it can inspire revolutionary ambitions, existentialism must […] first 
make a commitment to a self-examination process.”45  The autonomous self cannot exist 
autonomously until it severs its existential origins within the context of hegemonic constructions.  
Once one recognizes the self apart from society, he must then proceed to identify the processes of 
hegemony that transform this identification into an epiphany rather than a mere reflection, else he 
will remain entirely dependent upon those processes rather than his autonomous self, and will 
cease to be autonomous.  Hegemony encourages diminishment of the self and loss of 
individuality—dependence upon the dominant system of thought—for the sake of societal 
solidarity.  Numerous hegemonies construct our entire conceptions of existence, from self-identity 
to a sense of purpose and action.  However, the power of a single individual is no less than that of 
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a combined consciousness of individuals that represent the same societal „self‟ that these 
hegemonic processes create.  One individual who perceives differently from the rest of society 
presents as many new viewpoints as the sum of the rest of individuals who think alike.   Although 
his perceptions, too, have been shaped by society and its hegemonic processes, he has escaped the 
confines of that source of oppression by recognizing it, despite its secrecy, circumventing the most 
insidious attribute of oppressive hegemony in order to transcend it.  He thinks independently of 
the oppressive system, recognizes its original construction of him as a person, and therefore is 
capable of stepping outside of the confines of those societal constructs in order to examine them 
from a personal standpoint and reevaluate himself.  Once this individual establishes his personal 
relationship with the hegemonic structures, recognizing them for what they are and how they have 
contributed to his self-identity up until that point, he can choose to conform to those hegemonies 
or to criticize them and fight their oppression of truth based on his personal beliefs.  Thus, the 
individual recognizes the importance of his own uniqueness, and begins to develop that 
individuality for the sake of becoming even more than what he already is—he begins to develop 
the self.   
 In defining the hegemonic processes that oppress individuality, the autonomous person 
must eventually realize that even the process that led to her self-identification is tainted with 
groupthink tendencies, and that she has defined herself through hegemony and is not, in fact, a 
genuine individual until she can escape societal definitions of self and perceive apart from the 
thoughts of others.  This does not necessarily entail total escape from the realms of societal 
perceptions—i.e., common language, cultural and behavioral practices, etc.—but the individual 
must at least examine these perceptions for what they are.  She cannot choose to utilize language 
as a method of communication merely because everyone else does, but rather because she 
recognizes it as a common method by which ideas are transferred from one independent being to 
another.  Thus, the individual must begin a process of completely redefining everything that she 
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perceives in light of self-understanding rather than hegemonic thought.  If she defines even one 
aspect of her life through the lens of society rather than evaluating it in light of her newly-born and 
autonomous self, then she risks, at least in that one aspect, becoming a part of the hegemonic 
system she only just escaped.  As we have already said, it is not possible to completely escape 
hegemony—it is too subtle for even the most autonomous individuals to recognize in every aspect 
of their lives—but to conform without examination of those processes and complete accordance 
with them is to become oppressed once more.  Construction of the self, therefore, is a lifelong 
process of examining which hegemonies contribute towards our self-understanding and asking 
whether those trades of freedom for systemic order are in accord with our personal beliefs.  One 
must never stop examining oneself and the hegemonic structures that create us, lest we make the 
false assumption that we have discovered all there is and fall into the same groupthink tendencies 
we set out originally to avoid.  This essay is not written to imply that groupthink tendencies are 
necessarily bad, nor favoring solidarity over individuality, but for an autonomous person to exist 
and contribute new perspectives to a perceptually stagnant society, it is critical for her to release 
herself from the confines of societal definitions and think apart from others.   
Solidarity benefits society, but stagnation is its bane.  “My brothers!” Nietzsche warns us:  
What actually poses the greatest danger to the future of man? Is it not the good and the 
righteous? Is it not those who speak from their hearts and feel in their hearts:  „We already 
know what is good and what is righteous, we already possess it; watch out for those who 
are still searching for it around here!‟ 
 
Whatever harm the evildoers may do:  the harm the good do is the most harmful of all!
46
 
   
The “good and the righteous” to whom Nietzsche refers are those who are already satisfied with 
the state of society and believe that it no longer needs change.  Perfection is a lofty goal that some 
argue can never be attained, yet societies all over the world contend that their methods are the 
„best possible.‟ Democratic societies admit that although they can never fully represent the 
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interests of all the people, their governmental systems are the best at doing this, therefore 
democracy should exist everywhere.  Nietzsche‟s warning to us is that these „good‟ and 
„righteous‟ people who „know‟ what goodness and righteousness is, and act upon those tenets with 
every fiber of their beings do society the absolute greatest harm, for as „perfect‟ as any society 
may deem itself to be, James‟ philosophy resonates within us all—we cannot know absolute truth, 
therefore we cannot know absolute goodness until the very last person in existence has spoken her 
very last thought.  Perfection cannot be attained until the end of everything, so those who claim to 
know that we have attained it and should search no more do society the greatest harm by 
discouraging it from continuing to move forward.  “To know is one thing, and to know for certain 
that we know is another.”47  Individuals who think apart from hegemonic structures are needed to 
help us perceive this reality, for they lead the ignorant righteous out of their dark corners, 
illuminating the potentiality of society and thus establishing the basis for an ever-brighter future.  
In order to do this, these autonomous individuals must discover the nature of their inherent selves 
and delve into that personal nature of existence.  The self that exists apart from society is the 
saving grace of society, because that individual saves society from itself.   
Hegemonic processes suppress individuality, and upon examination of them, the individual 
realizes this and begins to define himself beyond those processes.  However, the realization that he 
is a separate and distinguishable self apart from society occurred within the context of this 
hegemony, meaning the process itself did not define him.  Something that inherently suppresses 
individuals from developing cannot create individuals, so the mere fact that his individual self 
exists apart from the society and its constraints implies that something else created him.  Since 
there are only two entities—society, and all of its influences, and the individual—this necessarily 
demonstrates that the individual is self-manifesting.  From the stagnant oppression of society was 
born a creative individual who thinks apart from all others and perceives differences that draw him 
apart as a separate and independent self.  Deep within his being, this individual exists, and has 
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always existed apart from society and its definitions.  Those definitions may have taught him how 
to categorize and communicate his individuality, but the similarities and dissimilarities between 
him and others existed prior to this understanding.  He was an individual before he was the citizen 
of a hegemonic society, and he knows this because the society that assimilated him as a part of 
itself did not draw him apart by its own devices—something within himself did. 
 It is at this stage that the individual realizes her own potentiality and the nature of the 
inherent self that exists independently of societal constraints.  The hegemony that destroys 
individuals can still be recognized as hegemony because certain individuals do not naturally fit the 
mold of the ideal citizen, and thus they feel oppressed.  The fact that these „abnormal‟ individuals 
exist implies that their uniqueness manifests from who they are, not who they have been shaped by 
society to be.   Thus, the individual recognizes that there is an inherent self that responds to 
society‟s influences apart from the manner in which she has been taught to respond.  She perceives 
herself as different from others, not because she has been encouraged to perceive herself apart 
from the unified whole of society, or distinguishable from the ideal citizen, but because she is 
different, she is self-manifesting, and she is defined autonomously.  This individual exists as a 
separate entity.  She exists, not as a part of a functioning society of solidarity, but apart from a 
unified and stagnant system of thought.  Her nature as a person who responds to external stimuli 
exists outside of external influences and instead manifests from an internal self that has always 
existed and responds in accordance with her personal preferences and perceptions, not the 
perceptions that she has learned to express.  This individual is, in the truest sense, an ideal citizen 
within herself because she embodies the very conceptions of society through her experiences, yet 
exists autonomously so as to contribute to its growth.  The alienation she feels may diminish her 
personal self-worth and encourage resentment of society from within because of that 
diminishment, but Nietzsche says, “I love the great despisers, because they are the great reverers, 
arrows of longing shot across to the other shore.”48  True citizens are they who love society so 
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much that they begin to despise it, begin to reveal its inner flaws, because ultimately, their way of 
contributing towards the goodness of that society is by reforming it.  There is no better way to do 
this than to develop the autonomy that breeds this „longing‟ for a better world.  Autonomous 
individuals can continuously improve their societies for the better, attaining the dream of making 
the world a better place, and they do this by defining themselves apart from those societies.   
 Defining the self can be a tricky process, because it involves the use of learned processes 
of self-examination within the contexts of society‟s methods.  Psychoanalysis teaches individuals 
to draw their emotional responses back to experiences in their early childhood, suggesting that 
experiences shape an individual, rather than the individual being self-manifesting.  Other methods 
of self-examination, such as religious views of determinism relate the self back to cosmic forces.  
Some psychologists suggest that individuals think merely based on processes of positive and 
negative reinforcement from others.  However, as we have demonstrated through examination of 
an autonomous individual, the true self that he discovers exists apart from all of these external 
influences.  Society encourages individuals to relate their feelings back to societal influences, but 
true self-examination must extend beyond these factors to find what is the response of one‟s true 
self.  For instance, if our self-manifesting individual was to express the sentiment that “hegemony 
is bad,” he would have to reflect on where this sentiment is coming from.  At first, he might find 
that society utilizes the word „hegemony‟ in negative contexts, but this does not reflect his own 
views, so he moves past such superficial realizations.  He might then delve into the definition of 
hegemony as a process of normalization, but then he must discover why normalization is negative 
in his mind.  Society encourages diversity, so he might conclude that because diversity is good and 
normalization inherently runs contrary to diversity, hegemony is bad, but this still relies on 
societal definitions.  Perhaps he concludes that he enjoys diversity, but if he enjoys it because 
society encourages him to do so, then his sentiments still are not self-manifesting.  If he takes this 
examination process one step further and evaluates the value of diversity as something that 
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recognizes the inherent qualities and differences between separate individuals, he might then 
conclude that he values diversity because he values differences between individuals.  This value 
may be derived from his personal sense of self-worth, because he recognizes that he possesses 
inherent qualities and differences, and ultimately, he likes those differences because he values 
himself as an individual that exists apart from the dominant norm.  Therefore, he believes that 
hegemony affects society in negative ways because it discourages his own existence, which he has 
come to value through recognition of his self.  Overall, the process of discovering one‟s self can 
be long and tedious, because it involves going back to the very beginning of one‟s core beliefs 
apart from the responses that individuals have been conditioned by society to express.  Those who 
truly examine their selves to the very core might find that their true self is not the kind of person 
society would encourage them to like—an evil person, for instance.  Perhaps they have a natural 
tendency towards violence and at their very center, believe violence is not truly wrong because it 
reflects their natural sentiments and the natural order of the universe by encouraging survival of 
the strong.  Ultimately, this process involves finding within oneself the true feelings and emotions 
that exist independent of societal influences.  This is how we come to know the self more 
thoroughly, and thus develop an autonomous perspective, for the self that we learn to recognize is 
independent of hegemonic processes and is thus different from all others. 
 It is not the intention of this essay to imply that experiences and interactions with others do 
not influence our behavior and thought processes, but rather to imply that people‟s behaviors and 
thoughts may not necessarily run in concordance with the sentiments or aspirations of their true 
selves.  Normalization and hegemony naturally encourage individuals to behave and think alike, 
so these processes draw on similarities in human circumstance to encourage similarities in 
behavior and thought.  Rather than suggesting that some people are merely born with a tendency 
towards depression, society relates these individuals‟ feelings to depressing aspects of their 
upbringing, such as the death of a close family member of friend.  This process undermines the 
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reality that demonstrates that some individuals who lose close family members respond 
optimistically rather than with bouts of depression.  It is simply assumed that depression is a 
„normal‟ human response, and that anyone who responds to the death of a family member 
differently is lacking in some fundamental human tendency, just like the narrator in Camus‟ The 
Stranger.  True autonomy means that individuals respond in their thoughts and behavior to 
external stimuli in accordance with their deeper selves rather than in accordance with expectation.  
Cultivation of the self, therefore, demands that individuals act contrary to society‟s expectations 
when their true selves diverge from the dominant norm.  An individual who wishes to remain 
autonomous and has a natural inclination to go sky-diving should do so, rather than avoid the 
natural inclination because of society‟s emphasis on risk-aversion.   
 Autonomous individuals have the potential of revealing a new and diverse perspective to 
their society by using normal processes of communication to share their abnormal responses to 
various situations.  Autonomy implies creativity, because an autonomous individual can develop 
ideas outside of the normal realms of thought—her scope has no boundaries because it is not 
limited by societal norms or perceptions that are funneled through the common lens of the 
dominant norm.  Therefore, autonomy is essential to innovative processes because it allows unique 
solutions to be presented to new problems.  A society is limited in its prospects by hegemonic 
processes because it inhibits new ideas from emerging by encouraging everyone to think alike, and 
to limit their thoughts to those that the dominant norm is likely to share.  Innovation is an 
important process in helping societies to face new challenges, like the inherent oppression of a 
society that defines normality.  Hegemony is destructive as a social process because it oppresses 
individuals, but it is also destructive because it is self-proliferates—hegemony discourages people 
from recognizing that hegemony affects society in a negative way and should be changed in order 
to benefit everybody. 
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 Freire says that ethical individuals have a responsibility to stand up against injustice when 
they recognize it, and to combat oppression for the sake of the greater good.
49
  Ergo, an ethical 
autonomous individual has the responsibility to combat the hegemonic system of oppression—
essentially, society itself—for the greater good of all of society.  Oppression limits society‟s 
potentiality, and hegemony further entrenches this system of oppression, so it is the responsibility 
of autonomous individuals—those who have stepped outside of the cultural norms to recognize 
independently of an oppressive system—to fight hegemonic processes, vindicating themselves and 
freeing others from social tyranny.  Levinas supports such notions, saying that an ethical 
individual, out of deference for the “other” who essentially created the self by existing as a basis 
for comparison, ought to strive for the good of the “other” always.  However, in combating 
oppression, it is important for the autonomous individual to remain autonomous, yet ethical in 
striving for the greater good.  He ought always to have the greatest good of others in mind, not 
through society‟s definitions of “good,” which inherently oppress the minority, but through his 
own understanding of “good” through his autonomous lens and personal experiences with others‟ 
autonomous selves.  Nietzsche “love[s] him who squanders his soul, who neither seeks nor offers 
thanks, because he always gives away and does not preserve himself”50—real heroes are those 
who know the self first but cares for the self second. 
Hegemony suppresses autonomy, but so long as autonomous individuals develop their 
notion of self and recognize that self independently of hegemonic influences like conglomerate 
societies, then the hope that the wrongs of hegemony will be undone persists.  Autonomous 
individuals are the creators in society that present innovative ideas, but if they are to be ethical 
individuals, then they should, as our philosophers dictate, also strive to better the lives of others 
around them.  Not every autonomous individual is strong enough to recognize and work against 
oppressive forces like hegemony, but those who are become the heroes of society.  A true hero is 
an autonomous individual—someone who recognizes goodness itself apart from society‟s 
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definitions of what is “good”—who works to better all of society and the people therein by 
helping others to recognize their selves.  This may be done by the hero helping others to reach 
self-realization, but weaker individuals first need oppressive forces to be removed before they can 
allow their true self to step forward.  Thus, our hero, in reaching self-realization and recognizing 
hegemonic processes, must help others by combating those processes that would oppress others 
from being who they are in lieu of what society encourages them to be. 
Definition of self is critical in the heroic process, for only through self-realization can a 
hero step outside of the confines of society in order to recognize its flaws.  By thinking 
independently of a system convinced of its own self-worth, the true individual has the power to 
transform that system for the better.  Indeed, as we have shown here, the ethical individual must 
do so for the sake of the “other,” fighting against oppression.  Ultimately, the true hero is a person 
who not only recognizes his inherent worth as an individual, but also the inherent worth of every 
individual and the diverse perspective that she represents.  By recognizing individuality as a 
powerful attribute that enhances processes of innovation that drive society towards a greater good 
for all, autonomous heroes diminish the hegemonic processes that drive individuals towards 
groupthink, preventing oppression, and they also help society to drive itself towards self-
improvement without the need for drastic cataclysms to help society “start over” and thus repeat 
its mistakes of the past.  Heroism is salvation of those who cannot help themselves, but it is also 
salvation of those who do not realize they are in need of help.   
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One of the most critical attributes of the self-sacrificing heroes outlined here in this essay 
is that these heroes are originally perceived as villains.  Numerous characters throughout the 
course of history have fulfilled this role as autonomous individuals who sought to overthrow a 
system of hegemony by challenging it, and were subsequently chastised and despised for it, only 
to be recognized as heroes by society many years later.  Martin Luther serves as a valuable 
example—portrayed as an enemy of the Church for criticizing it to the point of division, he is now 
viewed as an ethical reformist who elicited the flawed political intrigues of 15
th
 century 
Catholicism.  Luther‟s sacrificed his reputation in an attempt to help better the Church, and like 
many such heroes who dare to challenge the systems of which they are a part, he was viewed as an 
enemy of the system for many years thereafter.  Autonomous heroes of history like Luther 
sacrificed a great deal for the sake of getting their message out, and were only viewed as the 
heroes they were many years after their deaths. Still more of these heroic figures exist in fictional 
stories that drive into the heart of mankind for the sake of elaborating on our characteristic 
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weaknesses.  Regardless of their historic or fictional origins, each of these characters contributes 
towards the overall perception of what the ideal self-sacrificing hero ought to be.   
 History has demonstrated that those who challenge governmental systems of oppression 
are the first to be chastised for their efforts, and one of the best examples of this is the story of 
Socrates.  A sage-like figure in democratic Athens, Socrates taught that such worldly pursuits as 
wealth and athleticism were fleeting, whereas virtues were eternal.  The Athenian government 
encouraged admiration of those who succeeded materialistically, and indeed, a politician‟s interest 
lay in securing increasing financial stability for himself and his family.  Lawful regulation of 
men‟s actions, and encouragement of individual‟s self-pursuit was what made Athens great during 
its time, for the governmental system encouraged men to follow their own hearts, and empowered 
them to do so by having an influence in the governmental process.  As Foucault tells us,  
Among the Greeks and Romans […] concern with the self and care of the self were 
required for right conduct and the proper practice of freedom, in order to know oneself […] 
as well as to form oneself, to surpass oneself, to master the appetites that threaten to 
overwhelm  one.
51
  
 
Indeed, Athens‟ system encouraged such individuality as to function as a stable, yet mostly 
peaceful state surrounded by other cities in turmoil, because its citizens were content to pursue 
their own goals, and as long as they continued such pursuits, Athenian democracy—in a political 
as well as economic sense—flourished.  Care for the individual fostered care for the society, and 
thus both flourished.  However, as all societies, Athens was founded upon an original system of 
morals and values that, once undermined, would represent the end of the government as it stood.  
This is the reason that eventually, Socrates is accused of „corrupting‟ the Athenian youth, for his 
purpose in cultivating virtue undermines the pragmatic purpose of Athenian democracy. 
Stanley Fish asserts that it is the moral responsibility of one who believes he is right to 
assert his perspectives “with a vengeance”52 upon others, which is what the Athenian government 
eventually does in sentencing Socrates to death.  However, other scholars contend that in the 
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pursuit of ultimate truth, which was the aim of Socrates and the Athenian politicians, one must be 
open and willing to listen to and accept the ideas of others as potential truths within themselves.
53
   
 In his trial, Socrates contends,  
I spend my whole life in going about and persuading you all to give your first and chiefest 
care to the perfection of your souls, and not till you have done that to think of your bodies, 
or your wealth; and telling you that virtue does not come from wealth, but that wealth, and 
every other good thing which men have, whether in public, or in private, comes from 
virtue.  If then I corrupt the youth by this teaching, the mischief is great.
54
  
 
His stance is that in teaching the youth of Athens to pursue something more than the material 
gains of life and politics,  he has cultivated the truest Athenian citizen the government could ask 
for.  The individuality promoted by democracy encourages citizens to pursue higher truths for 
themselves, and in exercising this freedom, Socrates has discovered that higher truth resides in 
contemplation and thought rather than in the gathering of possessions and power.  Ultimately, he 
engages in this higher contemplation only to discover that his thoughts extend beyond himself and, 
in order to attain their fullest potential, must be shared with the minds of others.  As he has been 
encouraged to share his voice in a democratic society that believes in pursuing the greatest good 
through the concept of the marketplace of ideas,  by fully engaging the concept of freedom of an 
Athenian citizen and exercising his individuality, Socrates fulfills his duty as a moral citizen.  His 
only error, then, lies in the assumption that the Athenian society truly exists according to its 
philosophical intent, rather than its pragmatic one.   
 Schauer‟s criticism of the marketplace of ideas resides within the impracticality of a fully 
rational society.  He understands that complete rationality does not exist “for the public at large,”55 
and thus for the sake of pragmatism, advocates that some opinions must be suppressed for 
society‟s good.  In a parallel context, pragmatism outweighs the philosophical aims of the 
Athenian government, for practicality within society demands materialistic pursuits in order to 
maintain a functioning economy.  As such, rather than extol Socrates for his brilliance in 
exercising his democratic voice to contribute to the general Athenian conception of truth, the 
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politicians condemn Socrates as a corrupting force who misleads good citizens on their paths 
toward greatness.  In asserting philosophical virtues over political gains, Socrates undermines the 
power structure of Athens and turns society on its head so far as its methodologies for functioning 
from a political, economic, religious, and social standpoint.  Pragmatism overrules his pursuit of 
truth, and thus Socrates, in seeking to become a hero to his society by liberating it from the 
shadowy falsities of materialism, becomes perceived as a villain who corrupts the youth of his fair 
city, because he advocates a level of dedication to truth that his society finds unrealistic and 
dangerous.  His undoing is in being the ultimate citizen, because he pursues society‟s ideals 
instead of its reality. 
 In the end, Socrates dies for „the good of Athenian society‟ so far as the political leaders of 
Athens are concerned, because in ending his life, they put an end to the threat to their livelihood 
that he represents.  Athenian society cannot coexist with Socrates‟ pursuit of truth, although it 
does maintain that truth can only be attained through pursuit of knowledge and dialogue.  In other 
words, Athens divines a means by which to attain truth, and even asserts to provide that means 
through a democratic government where society is founded upon the notions of rationality and 
dialogue.  However, the fundamental assumptions of that foundation limit the society to rationality 
and dialogue only so far as those ideals do not inhibit functionality.  As soon as open thought and 
participation in the democratic process become a hindrance to society functioning with the 
underlying assumptions of how a society ought to function, that openness vanishes and gives way 
to a society of boundaries and rules. 
 Every society is composed of countless hegemonic structures, and one of the fundamental 
hegemonies from which Socrates sought to escape in Athens was the hegemony of pragmatism 
over idealism.  Ultimately, the higher truth is the aim of both the Athenian politicians and 
Socrates, but the hegemonic structure laid down with the foundation of Athens placed pragmatism 
first, because it is pragmatism alone that preserves society from failure.  As a true self-sacrificing 
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hero, Socrates defied that hegemonic structure, challenged it, and lost.  He became perceived as a 
villain, not by all of the Athenians, but by their leaders who recognized the importance of 
pragmatism and placed the survival of society above its definition as a truth-pursuing society.  
Clearly such practicality is not a crime, for it represents preservation of the people—a lofty goal, 
indeed, for supposedly self-serving politicians.  Guardini suggests that Socrates‟ case is not a 
matter of right and wrong, but rather a matter of right vs. right and who has the authority to assert 
one over the other.
56
  Athens‟ hypocrisy therefore, lies in using that power to oppress the type of 
free-thinking it claims to condone, and Socrates‟ only „crime‟ is in asserting those claims to their 
fullest extent, living as a true Athenian who puts the pursuit of truth and the common good above 
all else.  
 Socrates exemplifies our self-sacrificing hero in the contexts of defying society in order to 
better it, and being despised for attempting to undermine the false hegemonic structures that 
construct everyday existence in order to free others to pursue a greater purpose.  However, one 
must not overlook the fact that Socrates is able to accomplish this goal from within the society, 
without every needing to step outside of it and transcend its bounds.  He defies Athenian 
rationality through rational arguments, using the same discourse that constructs Athenian life, but 
challenging it nonetheless.  In some ways, this is much more difficult than challenging a society 
from without, but in others it is much easier.  Socrates challenges the assumptions that the ultimate 
pursuits of life are based on materialism, yet he never escapes the material benefits of having 
grown up in Athenian wealth.  Despised only by leaders for endangering their way of life, Socrates 
dies a villain to very few, because his challenge to society is not great, it merely represents a way 
of thinking that those in power are not prepared to accept.  Those who truly matter—his 
disciples—see Socrates as a hero from the start, and thus they preach his message of the pursuit of 
truth, purporting it to be the greatest pursuit and listening to none who would challenge them.  
Thus Socrates‟ followers engage in their own, newly-defined hegemony in search for Socrates‟ 
 54 
intent instead of the significance of his actual message that truth can be discovered through 
rational dialogue, and it truly is the highest pursuit of all.  The story of Socrates is one of self-
sacrifice and heroism, but this heroism does not delve deeply enough to capture the ideals of this 
essay. 
 One of the most historical figures who pursued a greater good through less-than-ideal 
actions was Qin Chi Huang Ti—the first emperor of China.  History describes very little of Huang 
Ti‟s personal motivations, but Quentin Tarantino‟s film Hero portrays the emperor in a fictional, 
but ideal mystical light.  Perceived as a tyrant by even his closest advisors, Huang Ti begins his 
conquest as one of many kings in his region.  A brilliant military tactician, he ravages the towns 
and cities of his numerous rivals, forcing his opponents into submission one by one.  This 
ultimately wins him the hatred of countless warriors, including four assassins who risk their very 
lives to see Huang Ti killed.  However, as one assassin named Broken Sword prepares to deliver 
the death blow to the tyrannical king, he looks into Huang Ti‟s eyes and sees the king‟s true intent.  
He allows Huang Ti to live, as does the hero “Nameless,” once they realize that Huang Ti, while 
malicious and tyrannical, seeks to unite the kingdoms in order to end all wars between his people 
and others.  For the sake of uniting all of the land, he willingly takes on the mantle of the villain, 
slaughtering hundreds of thousands, leaving enemies and burned villages in his wake, but in the 
end, as history tells us, it leads to the unification of China, and the founding of a great nation 
where war is no longer the rule, but the exception to everyday life. 
 Although Huang Ti‟s challenge to hegemonic structures in his society is very different 
from that of Socrates, his mission is no less heroic.  Whereas Socrates challenges the predominant 
notions of materialism through rhetoric, Huang Ti challenges the predominant notions of 
continuous war.  Just like other societies trapped in hegemonic ideals discussed previously, the 
kingdom of Qin and other surrounding nations have mentally embraced war as a necessary part of 
life.  Caught up in retributive battles based on retribution for more battles in the past, each 
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kingdom fights ceaselessly with one another because every citizen has adopted the hegemonic 
ideal, as Brenda Allen suggests, that, “that‟s the way we do things around here.”57  Citizens of 
Qin, as well as previous kings of Qin fall into this pattern of thought.  They never look past the 
hegemony that constructs the pattern to realize that reform will not come from continuing to fight 
one retribution battle after another, but rather from stepping outside of that pattern and mastering 
the entire region under one unified dominion instead of a conglomeration of regions that cannot 
coexist autonomously.  Qin Chi Huang Ti finally challenges this ideology by refusing to be 
satisfied with mere vengeance and instead taking his war to a more global level such that his 
enemies will not return to stab him in the back. 
Like Socrates, Huang Ti fails to step outside of the structure from which he seeks to 
liberate his society, for he commits to warlike action to end war—hypocrisy, in its truest sense.  
Nonetheless, Huang Ti also takes another critical step beyond Socrates, in that he willingly goes 
so far to challenge the structure of which he is a part that he becomes society‟s enemy in society‟s 
eye.  In Hero, the king even acknowledges that the people closest to him “regard [him] as a 
tyrant,” and he willingly accepts that role for the betterment of all.  He knows that uniting the land 
will bring the greatest benefit to his people overall, but that such a task must be purchased with the 
blood of countless innocents.  Huang Ti sacrifices his very soul, becoming the „evil‟ that he 
condemns in order to pursue a greater good, demonstrating dedication, in the truest sense, to his 
cause.  Socrates is not willing to compromise himself for the benefit of others, and indeed, he does 
not need to.  However, Huang Ti makes the ultimate sacrifice by recognizing that even though the 
very people he is trying to save may hate him, he will take the role of the villain and the tyrant for 
their sake.   
 Huang Ti‟s sacrifice is especially unique because it justifies evil for the sake of a greater 
good.  Is a hero then, any person who challenges society‟s norms by committing evil acts? Is 
Hannibal Lector a hero? Is Osama bin Laden? I would not go so far as to say so.  We must always 
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keep in mind the ethical components of a hero as constructed at the beginning of this essay, that 
ultimately, a hero is a moral person that, as Heller suggests, prefers “suffering injustice (being 
wronged) to committing injustice (doing wrong),”58 who always keeps in mind a personal 
conception of the responsibility to the “other” who constructs us.  A hero fights against the 
oppression of others  out of a sense of moral responsibility and awareness of others before 
oneself.  Historically it is impossible to determine whether Huang Ti‟s actions were moral—and 
therefore heroic—but even in the fictional contexts of Quentin Tarantino‟s Hero we must ask 
ourselves whether Huang Ti‟s pursuits are made out of an awareness for the sufferings of others, 
or rather out of his personal sense of suffering from the harms of war.  It appears to me that the 
case falls into the latter category: Huang Ti is still not an ideal hero, because he does not 
necessarily commit to all-out war for the good of his people, but for his own sense of security.  
Indeed, an ideal hero might have sought conquest without bloodshed so as to promote the greatest 
good for all, but he does go one step further in willingly becoming the villain to his society, if only 
so that society itself would be made better by his actions.  Socrates argues against the judgment 
brought upon him, but still accepts his society for what it is; in contrast, Huang Ti defies his.  
 At this point, when we find ourselves questioning the importance of morality in a self-
sacrificing hero, we should turn to a hero whose morality is considered by many to be 
unquestionable:  Jesus Christ.  Whether taken in a historical context or a mythical one, the story of 
Jesus of Nazareth advocates peace and understanding far above any notions of hostility or 
retribution.  Indeed, Jesus exemplifies our self-sacrificing hero because of his peacefulness, for 
many of his challenges to the authority figures in Rome resounded on the harsh treatment of those 
who were already suffering—such as beggars, prostitutes and thieves.  Jesus called his followers 
to forgive and be merciful, whereas Roman authorities called its citizens to punish their criminals 
without mercy.  Thus, Jesus preached a message of love in place of condemnation, of peace in 
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place of hostility, and of forgiveness in place of chastisement, all for the sake of betterment within 
oneself and of one‟s neighbors.   
 Just as in the case of Athens and Socrates, the Romans were not wrong to advocate 
something different from our heroic figure.  Indeed, religious history would have us perceive 
Roman society as a malicious and evil empire, but one must remember that Rome flourished with 
great technology, innovation, and social movements for a reason:  its societal construction 
functioned.  The punishments that Jesus preached against were harsh in Roman society to deter 
criminals from repeating their offense, which made Roman citizens feel like they lived in a safe 
world in which they were free to go about their daily lives without fear of being mugged or 
murdered.  As Moore says, “horrible cruelty was appropriate and necessary to combat morally 
horrible and socially dangerous crimes.”59  Castigation maintained order in a free society and 
encouraged tremendous wealth, prosperity, and growth.  Fostered by this prosperity, Jesus grew to 
recognize that the hegemonic structure of Rome could lead to humanity‟s self-destruction if that 
system could not be changed, for the abuse of power is as potentially damaging as the lack thereof.  
Thus, he took it upon himself to rationalize mercy in the minds of his brethren, to preach peace as 
the ultimate end for all wars, and to teach forgiveness as the path towards Paradise, for every 
person in this world has been wronged by another, and in turn every person has wronged another.  
Pursuit of retribution is what ultimately leads to the vicious circle of wars and poverty; escape 
from it must come about by another means. 
 Jesus‟ recognition of a hegemonic structure within society is perhaps one of the most 
prominent in recorded history, for his was a method that escaped the cultural norms of thousands 
of years of western civilization.  He truly epitomizes the ideal of escaping a hegemonic structure 
and defying it in an attempt to re-form society into something better.  Indeed, his defiance of 
Roman culture is what eventually led to his execution, which inevitably causes us to view him as 
the ultimate self-sacrificing hero.  However, in examining Jesus, we must keep in mind that, like 
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Socrates, Jesus was not entirely opposed by general society.  Tales of Jesus record numerous 
followers who traveled with him and spread his message, and many more who preached it after his 
death, birthing the religion of Christianity.  He is a hero who stepped outside of the dominant 
paradigm of society in order to reform it, but Jesus was far from an exile within his own 
community.  Unlike Qin Chi Huang Ti, who incurred the hatred of his own people and lived in 
solitude amidst his own courtiers, Jesus was admired and revered by many throughout the course 
of his life because he never transcended the boundaries of acceptability, challenging his followers 
to redefine their existence through a different lens, but rather, he marched to the beat of the Roman 
citizens‟ drum and left words in his midst to propagate postmortem.  Jesus‟ sacrifice is different 
because the sacrifice of his “self” only includes his physical “self”—for that is what inspired 
defiance and reform in his followers. 
 In the second chapter of this essay, we examined the significance of the “self” and its 
discovery in defining the self-sacrificing hero.  Jesus Christ nearly captures the ideal self-
sacrificing hero, except that the “self” that he gives is less than all of his “self” as it has been 
described.  Self-sacrificing heroes such as Jesus have been revered throughout the centuries for 
their courageousness in facing death for their beliefs, Socrates being another excellent example.  
However, the purpose of this essay is not to reemphasize the glory of such heroism, but rather to 
examine a different type of heroism that is too-often overlooked:  that of women and men who 
sacrifice the entirety of their selves—the hidden essences that extend to their very souls, such that 
even they might perceive themselves as evil in the end, for they are willing to take on the burden 
of sin for themselves, that others need not.  It is said by Christians that Jesus took the burden of 
the sins of humankind upon himself at his death, despite never having sinned himself, and he is 
certainly a hero, in the truest sense for doing so, but Jesus never endangered his own soul by being 
perceived as a villain for the greater good.  He never risked spending eternity in Hell so that his 
 59 
followers would not have to.  The biblical Jesus led his followers to a greater world, so he did not 
sacrifice his own eternity for their sake; our self-sacrificing hero would. 
 Contrasting with the mortal self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and paradoxically a fictional tale 
about one of Jesus‟ followers, one of the most inspiring tales of a truly “self”-sacrificing hero that 
comes to mind is Miguel Unamuno‟s San Manuel Bueno.  The priest of a small Catholic village in 
Spain, Don Manuel inspires the lives of countless people around him by demonstrating the utmost 
faith in God and His divine mercy and compassion.  Drawn to the priest‟s spirituality, the story‟s 
narrator, Angela, commits herself to the service of the Church, and attempts to convert her atheist 
brother Lazzaro to Christianity for fear of his soul.  Don Manuel helps Lazzaro to come to terms 
with the existence of God by confessing that he—a  priest—does not believe in God, either.  When 
confronted with the notion that he is living a lie and will probably spend eternity in Hell for his 
lack of faith, Don Manuel essentially tells Angela that while he does not believe in God, he does 
have faith in the belief in God—the notion that belief in God brings out the betterment of human 
kind.  Don Manuel, knowing that if he is wrong, he is sacrificing his soul, commits what he knows 
is a sin—lying—for the sake of promoting a greater good in the lives of the people around him.  
He improves the entire village through his inspiration, however false it may be, and thus sacrifices 
himself to their cause.  
 Don Manuel overcomes the orthodoxy of traditional Christian faith by adhering to its 
overall message while ignoring some of its moral tenements and topical criteria.  Regular practices 
of almsgiving and forgiveness instill in Don Manuel‟s Christian followers the notions of serving 
others before oneself, reinforcing Jesus‟ message of love through blind action.  While beneficial to 
society, these actions reflect hegemony within the society through consistent and unquestioned—
some might say “mindless”—benevolence.  The other  Christians in Don Manuel‟s village are 
charitable to one another, not because they believe in charity, but because they believe that God 
has instructed them to be charitable.  This type of naïve acceptance without consideration of the 
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hegemonic structures that constructed the ideals in the first place is precisely what autonomous 
individuals overcome, which is why Don Manuel serves as a prime example of a self-sacrificing 
hero.  Aware of the potentiality of the non-existence of God, and unable to verify either way, Don 
Manuel transcends the societal paradigm and steps outside of it to justify goodness towards others 
on his own terms.  Autonomously, he discerns a reason to assert goodness towards his fellow 
human beings—for the sake of goodness itself—and commits to maintain the hegemonic structure, 
not because he blindly follows it, but because he believes that enforcement of blind Christianity 
attains the same goals that he wishes to achieve.  Exhibiting the process of self-analysis and 
discovery of the hegemonic structures within society that originally created his notions of self-
identity, Don Manuel discovers an autonomous self within until he manages to transcend those 
hegemonies and utilize his newly empowered „self‟ for the greater good.  Such is the idea behind 
finding the true „self‟ in order to become our type of self-sacrificing hero.   
Unamuno‟s portrayal of San Manuel Bueno brings to light a new notion of self-sacrifice, in 
that it demonstrates to us the value of becoming evil in others‟ eyes, earning condemnation from 
those one is attempting to save.  In Unamuno‟s tale, only Angela and Lazzaro know of Don 
Manuel‟s secret atheism, and the latter is inspired by it, while the former does not know whether 
to berate or admire Don Manuel for it.  Regardless,  Don Manuel‟s contributions to the lives of 
others are unquestionably benevolent.  Ought God to condemn him to Hell for demonstrating 
Christian values against his own inclination, or is such morality in the face of adversity to be 
rewarded? Don Manuel lies, knowing that to lie is a sin; he lives the life of an atheist, knowing 
that to do so is to condemn himself to the inferno.  However, given that he does not believe in the 
afterlife, we may struggle to define whether or not he is truly self-sacrificing.  Don Manuel really 
has nothing to lose by lying to the populace, at least in his view, because there is no Hell for him 
to suffer in.  He may commit any sins he deems worthwhile for the „betterment‟ of life on earth, 
without fear of repercussions, so is there truly any sacrifice involved? In asking this question, we 
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must not undermine the legitimacy of his life‟s sacrifice, for if there is no Heaven to look forward 
to, then Don Manuel dedicates his life toward helping his fellow human beings without  a chance 
to gain anything for himself.  If he cannot ascend to a paradise, then Don Manuel‟s mortal 
existence is all that he has.  He purposefully dedicates this limited existence towards helping 
others; to undermine that sacrifice is to overlook his admirable sincerity in believing that the best 
meaning in life is to contribute toward another‟s.  Still, Don Manuel‟s absolute dedication towards 
assisting the people in his village illustrates his willingness to live up to his personal principles by 
stepping outside of the hegemonic structure of religion and still practicing benevolence toward 
others, but it does not demonstrate any sense of willingness to challenge that structure at the cost 
of one‟s existence and moral sense of self.   
 Perhaps a better example of Don Manuel‟s sacrifice is Dostoevsky‟s Grand Inquisitor from 
The Brothers Karmazov.  Believing in God and Jesus, this cardinal places the savior Himself in 
prison after witnessing several miracles.  He confronts Christ and tells Him that He is no longer 
needed—that He in fact, is evil for His expectations of man.  The Grant Inquisitor and his fellow 
clergymen, out of benevolence—Christ‟s demonstrated mercy—believe that that it is unethical for 
God to expect weak men to follow Him.  A chosen elect might reach Him, but would He really 
damn the rest? The Grand Inquisitor says, “Man was created a rebel; and how can rebels be 
happy?”60  It is in the nature of how humankind was created that they should sin, so God, having 
created them, would be wicked indeed to punish humanity for rebelling against His covenant.  
Instead of preaching Christ‟s Word as it has been recorded, The Grand Inquisitor and other 
clergymen preach Christ‟s message of love—which they deem to be His most important message, 
and lie about the rest.  They claim to the populace that everyone can reach Heaven—they can even 
sin, so long as they place the burden of their sins upon the clergy.  The inquisitor and his followers 
love the people, even more than Jesus—they claim—because they love all of the people, not just a 
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select group of those strong enough to resist temptation.  Demonstrating more love than Jesus 
Christ Himself, the Grand Inquisitor dares God to damn him for that.   
 The Grand Inquisitor and other clergymen from Dostoevsky‟s story transcend the 
hegemony of traditional Christianity in order to interpret Christian values to their fullest extent.  
Unlike Don Manuel, these religious leaders hold no illusions that their lies will not condemn them 
in the afterlife, and yet, the Grand Inquisitor steps forward and challenges Jesus to damn him for 
his efforts.  Loving his fellow human beings enough to make their lives better with hope for a 
good afterlife, he lies to them, potentially condemning himself to Hell, and misleading the people 
who trust him.  Spitting in the face of the foundation of his faith—Christ—the Grand Inquisitor 
willingly embraces the part of a villain in order to spare his followers the torturous realization that 
their faith will be insufficient to save them in the end, for most of them are too weak and incapable 
of following God‟s covenants as laid down.  He steps outside the orthodoxy of Christianity in 
order to better Christianity as a progressive method towards peace and love between human 
beings.  In so doing, he takes on the role of an evil man who would steal the free will of others in 
exchange for their happiness, but is this really a sin? He claims that Jesus does not love His 
children enough to lead them into Paradise, and thus He deserves no praise.  On the other hand, 
the Grand Inquisitor embraces all of God‟s children and endures the pains of sin for their sakes.  
Sacrificing everything for the happiness of others, the Grand Inquisitor appears to be an ideal self-
sacrificing hero. 
 The Grand Inquisitor‟s dedication to the underlying messages of love and compassion of 
Christianity parallels Socrates‟ dedication to Athens‟ underlying message of individuality.  
Constructed by hegemonic systems that promote autonomy, individuals such as the Grand 
Inquisitor flourish in Dostoevsky‟s story to challenge the paradigms of Christianity just like Don 
Manuel—taking the ultimate message one step farther and in so doing, undermining many of the 
fundamental action-based assumptions of what an ideal Christian should look like.  We have 
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already discussed the preference of solidarity over autonomy that unites Christian followers in 
Dostoevsky‟s tale to the point where they permit the Grand Inquisitor to reject their own savior.  
The Grand Inquisitor even says, “This craving for community of worship is the chief misery of 
every man individually and of all humanity from the beginning of time,”61 but his personal 
transcendence of this pattern is what distinguishes the Grand Inquisitor as a hero.  Fully aware of 
the hegemonic structures that comprise his society, he rejects Christ‟s preference of the „strong‟ 
over the „pitiful‟62 and chooses to embrace all people as children to be loved.  This is in 
accordance with the hegemonic ideals of Christianity, but not its hegemonic practices.  Thus, the 
Grand Inquisitor demonstrates the nature of heroism ideally by illustrating the significance of 
defying the societal system of which he is a part, for the sake of enhancing its message and overall 
purpose in the end.   
 Nonetheless, one major problem with the self-sacrificing heroism of Don Manuel and the 
Grand Inquisitor is that the populace does not know what sacrifice they are making.  By definition, 
the type of self-sacrificing hero outlines thus far must not only transcend hegemony in order to 
define the self and challenge that hegemony from outside of its construct, but they must also lead 
others to see this hegemony for what it is and lead those others to self-awareness.  Don Manuel 
and the Grand Inquisitor skirt this responsibility by lying to their followers, further entrenching the 
populace that they are both trying to free in an entirely new hegemonic structure that is centralized 
around them instead of religion.  This oppression is no different from the oppression that the 
supposed heroes are fighting—it is just another wolf in sheep‟s clothing.  Unamuno‟s Don Manuel 
and Dostoevsky‟s Grand Inquisitor lack the “hero” aspect of self-sacrificing heroes because they 
do not lead their fellow human beings out of oppression; they merely oppress their followers in a 
whole new way.  Such behavior suggests a cyclic existence of oppressors, whereby the hero of one 
generation becomes the tyrant of the next, but the point of a truly self-sacrificing hero is not to 
reshape society according to her desires.  The point is merely for the hero to expose the oppressive 
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hegemonic structures within her society and help to instigate reform of those structures.  A hero is 
not the leader of a new society, merely the harbinger of change in an archaic one. 
 Perhaps one of the best examples of a self-sacrificing hero who deconstructs the flaws of 
his society but refuses to influence the construction of a new society is the character V from the 
film V for Vendetta.  Dedicated to the concepts of freedom and equality upon which his country 
was originally founded, V engages the new government of post-apocalyptic Great Britain in order 
to win these ideals back from tyranny.  V transcends the hegemony of the new government by 
escaping from one of its facilities for torturing and holding the “usual undesirables” and living in 
solitude to hone his personal skills that he will eventually use to challenge and overthrow the 
“prominent Party members.”   
Introducing himself to the population of London by blowing up an important government 
building, V then broadcasts a televised message that exposes the oppressive government for what 
it is and drives the citizens of London to confront this oppression by joining him in a political 
uprising one year from the date of his message.  V then murders a series of political figures who 
created the viral apocalypse that drove London‟s citizens into fear and panic so that those 
individuals could exploit that fear in order to establish a new government with them in charge.  
The deaths of these political figures encourage citizens to begin taking a stand, and ultimately, 
when every household in London empties out into the streets donning V‟s Guy Fawkes costumes, 
the absence of those political heads prevents the military from massacring the populace.  In other 
words, V leads the citizens of London to freedom from hegemony not only by encouraging them 
to stand up for themselves, but also by making the personal sacrifice of his own righteousness in 
order to protect the citizens from harm and carry out the work that they are unwilling and unable 
to.    
Evey—the woman who spends several months underground with V—demonstrates the 
subversion of the populace that makes V‟s sacrifice necessary.  At the beginning of the film when 
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Evey is on her way to a friend‟s house for a casual date, she is confronted by three “fingermen”—
elect officers of the government charged with keeping Londoners in line.  Once she learns their 
identity, Evey is unwilling to defend herself from being raped and instead gives out a cry for 
help—a cry that no other Londoner heeds for fear of retribution, except for V.  Fear has driven 
compliance into Evey and the other citizens of London—they turn their heads the other way when 
members of the government act unjustly for fear of reprisal.  After helping V by spraying mace in 
the face of a detective who would have shot our hero, she says, “I shouldn‟t have done that. I must 
have been out of my mind!” To which V responds by asking, “Is that what you really think, or is 
that what they would want you to think?” Evey has no response because she does not recognize 
the hegemonic structure that has prevented her from standing up from herself in the past and 
continues to do so in the present.   
Just like the „mask‟ that autonomous individuals recognize when they begin to define their 
independent selves, Evey and other Londoners don a separate, public identity in the face of 
government power.  This changes only when the autonomous hero V confronts that distinction and 
defies it, acting in accordance with his inner sentiments that run contrary to the government rather 
than in line with hegemonic expectations.  Indeed, as if to demonstrate to the people of London 
that distinctions between outward appearances and inward beliefs has become necessary, V wears 
a real mask in his public appearances to prevent others from discovering his identity.  In other 
words, his choice to don a physical mask presents a symbolic realization to the people of his 
country that for self-protection, every citizen must pretend to be something they are not, which is 
equated to childish costume-wearing fantasies rather than mature societies.   
V ultimately confronts London‟s hegemonic governmental system of oppression by 
defying the notions of security and control upon which the new government was founded—
defying public curfew, blowing up a building under the vigilant eyes of the city‟s officers, and 
overtaking a television station to deliver an uncensored message.  His methods unquestionably 
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shake the sensibilities of the people caught up in the hegemonic system—as reflected by Evey‟s 
response to his murder of Lewis Prothero and her calling him “a monster”—but also serve their 
purpose of undermining the system itself through brute force and popular persuasion.  He becomes 
a villain in the eyes of many for murdering those who stand in his way, but in serving as a villain 
to the existing society, V becomes a hero to the future society that will not be so dominated by 
oppressive governmental figures.   
Like Qin Chi Huang Ti, V willingly dons the mantle of a villain in the eyes of the populace 
in order to accomplish a greater good, but he also demonstrates the ethical awareness of Jesus and 
Socrates by not focusing his killing efforts on the populace itself.  Whereas Huang Ti sent his 
personal armies face-to-face with enemy troops to convert many nations into a unified one through 
bloodshed, V instead spares the two clashing armies of civilians and military from a bloody 
confrontation by severing the political heads of the government, preventing the military from 
putting a quick and violent end to the uprising of the people.  Unlike Don Manuel and the Grand 
Inquisitor, he shares his intentions with the people of London through a televised broadcast, 
unveiling the hegemony that he has grown to recognize and encouraging others to go beyond that 
oppressive system.  He does not ask the people—as Huang Ti does—to sacrifice themselves to 
overcome this oppression, but rather takes that burden upon himself, going so far as to be viewed 
as a “murderer” and “terrorist” by the very people he is trying to save—at least as we perceive the 
views of the people through the media.  Like Jesus, he challenges a hegemonic system by stepping 
outside of it and encouraging others to do the same, but unlike Jesus—and like our other heroic 
examples—he accepts the mantle of a “villain” by committing bloody acts of murder that even he 
considers to be heinous.  V sacrifices his soul for the sake of others—dirties his hands so that the 
hands of the rest of the populace may remain clean—then gives his life so that his tainted actions 
will not tarnish the new nation he has helped to create.   
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Perhaps the only thing that makes V‟s character as a self-sacrificing hero imperfect is the 
fact that his actions as a hero, by the time the film engages, are long overdue.   Even though the 
media portrays V as a villain by claiming that he uses violent weapons “against unarmed civilians 
in order to broadcast a message of hate,” and referring to him as a “terrorist” and a “murderer,” the 
fact remains that at the end of the film when the citizens of London are called to stand beside V to 
watch the destruction of Parliament, every home shown on the camera is empty, because every 
citizen in London has shown up in support of V‟s revolution.  V has become the self-sacrificing 
hero too late in the sense that it takes very little convincing to sway the populace in his favor—the 
populace already recognizes the oppressive hegemonic structure of the government and has simply 
failed to act.  Our ideal self-sacrificing hero confronts hegemony when it is still too subliminal to 
be recognized, when the populace itself is unaware of its own oppression such that they would 
prefer to destroy the hero than allow her to destroy the hegemonic system.  The positive attributes 
of hegemony are too tempting to suggest immediate overthrow, and V‟s position as a hero merely 
demonstrates that nobody was willing to stand up to tyranny sooner.   
 There is no specific model that comes to mind for the ideal self-sacrificing hero that this 
essay describes, but that does not mean the heroes mentioned above are to be discounted for their 
efforts.  Socrates, Qin Chi Huang Ti, Jesus, Don Manuel, the Grand Inquisitor and V all represent 
self-sacrificing heroes, and they should be recognized as such by modern society.  However, we 
must recall that Socrates, Jesus and V were mostly disliked by societal leaders rather than the 
populace, suggesting that their challenging to hegemonic structures were not entirely 
revolutionary, whereas Don Manuel and the Grand Inquisitor led their followers from one 
hegemony into another, diminishing their value as heroes in the first place, while Huang Ti lacked 
the moral component critical to comprising our self-sacrificing hero.  Still, Qin Chi Huang Ti, the 
Grand Inquisitor, Don Manuel and V all demonstrate the fundamental characteristic of unabashed 
amorality—in one sense or another—for the sake of leading others out of hegemony to a greater 
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good.  Heroes such as Jesus and Socrates were honored in their respective times and are honored 
now by their self-sacrifice, but the point of this essay is to demonstrate the honorability of heroism 
as demonstrated by these others.   
 Mind, this is not to undermine the importance of heroes such as Socrates and Jesus.  
Indeed, perhaps Jesus was beloved by so much of the populace not because He lacked the 
dedication to His principles of changing the world for the better, but because His methods of non-
violence were more persuasive than those of Qin Chi Huang Ti or V.  Similarly, Socrates lives on 
in the hearts of scholars mainly because of his peaceful resignation to his fate; one could argue 
that if he had challenged Athenian hegemony more forcefully, we might not remember him at all.  
The types of self-sacrifice that we already honor are still valid and critical to constructing changes 
for reform in society, but what of those heroes who are willing to put their souls on the line for the 
greater good?  
The ideal self-sacrificing hero is one who finds the true “self” at his core and recognizes 
the oppressive hegemonic structures that exist in her society, then uses her new knowledge to free 
others from oppression, even at the cost of the self that she has found.  She has the morality of 
Socrates and Jesus, but the dedication of the Grand Inquisitor, Don Manuel and V, and the 
openness and timeliness of Qin Chi Huang Ti.  A truly dedicated self-sacrificing hero gives 
everything at a time when it is inconvenient for other members in society to recognize the need for 
change, so that she instigates change when it is most important.  Hegemonic structures entrench 
themselves through normalization, and the purpose of the self-sacrificing hero is to be that bold 
face that steps out from the crowd to cry out in opposition.  Those who follow the rules of the 
system inevitably will protect it and thus condemn the hero, but that only makes the hero‟s role all 
the more important.  Her role is to unsettle the founded beliefs of blind followers and lead them to 
changes for a better world.  Ideally, she would be as self-aware as Socrates, as forceful as Huang 
Ti, as unique in perspective as Jesus, as dedicated as Don Manuel, as defiant as the Grand 
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Inquisitor, as altruistic as V, and would possess the morality described by philosophers, 
committing to all action for the sake of others at the cost of all that one can hope to give—if 
necessary.   
It is typical of society to chastise and oppress the abnormal, for that is how societies 
construct a common identity.  Nonetheless, is it necessary to condemn diversity for the sake of 
self-identification? Current processes of normalization are inherently oppressive, and that 
oppression extends especially to those individuals who dare to stand out and label hegemonic 
structures as “oppressive.” Their boldness meets with resistance, whether from the structure of 
power—as in the cases of Socrates, Jesus, and V—or from the populace itself that the heroes are 
trying to reform—as in the case of Huang Ti.  However, is it necessary to resist them, or ought 
they to be recognized as the heroes they are, sacrificing self for others in a demonstration of 
dedication towards the betterment of society as a whole? Just because he lacks the non-violent 
tendencies of Jesus, V is no less valuable to the citizens of London as an instrument of reform.  
Just because they lie to the people they are attempting to help, and defy normal sensibilities of 
morality, Don Manuel and the Grand Inquisitor demonstrate no less dedication to truth than 
Socrates.  These men are self-sacrificing heroes, and they illustrate a different kind of sacrifice—
greater in magnitude, in some regards—than even Jesus, because they sacrifice more than life in 
pursuing change for the greater good; they sacrifice their souls and entire selves for their cause.  
Such is the kind of heroism rarely recognized in modern society, though it truly is the instrument 
of reform that brings society towards a higher plane of existence.   
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Throughout the course of this essay, we have examined the transformation of the hero in 
parallel to societal perceptions.  Originally, the hero was a mythical figure of celestial origins who 
altered his surroundings using supernatural powers, then later the hero became a social outcast 
who overcame adversity under divine guidance to transform the world around him using his 
natural skills and abilities.  Finally, the hero was viewed as a typical individual who overcame 
normality and self-transformed into something more powerful, then used this ability to alter the 
world of others.  We have examined the process of this latter hero extensively, from the processes 
of hegemony that inscribe his original notions of „normality‟ to his realization of autonomy and 
subsequent ideal interactions with his society.  Hegemony is a real force utilized by societies to 
establish common identities, and thus inherently suppresses individuality, creating forms of 
societal oppression.  Self-sacrificing heroes are the individuals who identify these hegemonic 
systems upon comparison of the self to society and arrive at a realization that processes of 
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normalization are inherently oppressive and damaging to societies existing in an ever-transforming 
world, since innovation begins with diversity in perspectives.  These individuals exist 
autonomously and thus contribute a true „self‟ to society that has the capability of examining 
societal practices from an outside perspective.  Their autonomy allows them to see the fallibility of 
„invincible‟ societies and thus help those societies to improve in anticipation of future challenges, 
but this ability earns our autonomous heroes naught but scorn for their inability to „fit the mold.‟ 
 Heroes such as Martin Luther, Jesus, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. are renowned for 
their sacrifices because they placed themselves in danger by challenging authoritative figures in 
history to follow the will of the populace, risking their lives and reputations so that others might 
benefit from their actions.  However, what is recognized from individual-to-individual—that the 
best of friends are those that challenge us to be better people—does not typically apply in a 
societal context.  The media and public opinion denounce individuals who dare to speak out and 
claim the populace is wrong, such as the example of Qin Chi Huang Ti taking matters into his own 
hands and establishing peace in his geographical region by force.  Heroes who take matters into 
their own hands and challenge the people in this world to make it a better place meet with 
resistance and must ultimately sacrifice themselves if they are to get their message out, because 
the hegemonic systems that they must defy in order to instigate reform dominate the actions that 
the populace takes to defend its solidarity, and thoughts that influence them. 
 Repeatedly, I have mentioned this connection between solidarity and oppressive 
hegemony, but is oppression a necessary requisite to social cohesion? We regard solidarity in a 
positive light because human beings can accomplish more when unified, particularly because 
disunity frequently leads to conflicts, which negate the efforts of every society.  Nonetheless, 
when an individual submits her will to that of a single entity for the greater good, is this any less 
noble than an individual who chooses social exile and self-sacrifice for the same cause? The 
purpose here is not to insinuate that hegemony and social cohesion are inherently bad, but that 
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linking these two positive attributes to a concept as self-deprecating—from a societal standpoint—
as oppression is unnecessary and damaging to notions of progress and innovation.  To submit to 
the hegemony of language is not to inherently negate the value of other forms of communication, 
unless that submission automatically entails disdain for that which is different from the perceptual 
norm.  Individuals who have not been exposed to people with mental retardation often react 
negatively towards individuals with mental disabilities because they have accepted the paradigm 
of what „normal‟ is without considering that what is „abnormal‟ has inherent worth as well.  
Normalization does not necessarily insinuate that individuals that do not fit within the box of 
„normality‟ should be devalued, so long as those who accept processes of normalization maintain 
an open mind.  Thus, when a mentally retarded individual confronts the hegemonic perceptions of 
a „normal‟ individual and challenges her notions of the inherent „rightness‟ associated with 
normality, that „normal‟ individual ought to remain open to this challenge to her methods of 
thinking and be willing to constantly restructure her perspective. 
 Adaptability is just as relevant to the individual psyche as it is to society, for only through 
adaptation do individuals grow, as well  as the societies of which they are a part.  If experiences 
and alternative viewpoints did not consistently undermine individual perceptions, then those 
perceptions would never change and thus the individual would never grow wise to his ever-
changing world.  Restructuring of one‟s perspective, as we have already examined, leads to further 
understanding of the self, as well as further understanding of society and the diverse individuals 
that it consists of.  Negotiations between combating nations involve a deep understanding of one‟s 
own societal perspective, as well as a deep understanding of one‟s opponents.  Only through deep 
understanding between diverse perspectives can common ground be established in order to link 
those two perspectives together that they may grown together in the future.  We understand the 
world around us better by understanding the people in it, including ourselves, and through this 
understanding, we learn to transform this world for the better. 
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 Autonomous individuals serve the same purpose as the mentally retarded individual 
mentioned above, except that their role is more likely intentional.  Like the mentally retarded 
individual who challenges the naïve perceptions of a „normal‟ individual, the autonomous 
individual defies expectations and proves that diversity is a positive attribute.  Differences 
enlighten understanding, and autonomous individuals who choose to be heroes have the 
responsibility of demonstrating this through their actions.  To bring an idea to light that many 
other members of the populace share, but that the people in society do not share is difficult and 
worthy of note.  However, still more valuable are those individuals willing to step forward and 
challenge the sensibilities of every person around them, to step outside of the paradigms of society 
and reevaluate hegemonies in light of individuality, to defy oppression in the guise of normality 
and encourage others to understand more of themselves for the benefit of all.  Self-sacrificing 
heroes willingly don the mantle of the villain by assuming the role on behalf of others and thus 
allowing others to see the villains within themselves without ever having to dirty their hands with 
disgrace.  These heroes transform us by holding themselves up as a mirror to society and 
transmuting the image there in accordance with their self-knowledge to help us see ourselves in a 
better light.  They are not „evil‟ in the sense that they have no philosophical conception of what is 
right or wrong—indeed, as we have said before, self-sacrificing heroes must have a moral center 
in order to be deemed heroic—but rather, they are „evil‟ in the sense that they take the burden of 
sin upon themselves and give their souls for the sake of others.   
 A truly self-sacrificing hero recognizes the dangers of groupthink tendencies and 
automatic, unthinking dedication to social hegemonies.  She does everything in her power to defy 
it and help others to see the potential in reality if only they would be willing to accept change for 
the better.  Change is a frightening concept to individuals; it is what prevents many from engaging 
in the self-examination process that helps them to find autonomy, because it alienates the self from 
society in the sense that it causes individuals to perceive themselves and their surrounding world 
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in an entirely different light.  This new perception can unveil horrific realizations of how awful 
this world is, which is why so many are loathe to attain it, but only through this perception of the 
world as flawed can we ever hope to change it for the better.  Harbingers of change such as our 
autonomous individuals have not been appreciated in ancient societies, and they are still not 
appreciated today, for they compel us to look beyond our naïve notions that the world is more 
pleasant than it truly is, and they require us to either accept that reality and thus lose our right to 
hope, or to act on that perception, which is much more difficult than leading a tranquil life of 
apathy.   
 Self-sacrificing heroes defy the sensibilities of normal individuals for the sake of a better 
world.  Theirs is an autonomous perception of the world as it is:  flawed, and ugly, but filled with 
potential.  They do not conform to the oppressive hegemonies of society, nor do they permit others 
to do so.  Instead, they confront the reality that is existence by finding their true selves and 
extending those selves outwards to encompass true conceptions of abstract concepts, including 
those of right and wrong, of justice, of love, and of hope.  These heroes recognize that helping 
others to find this realization is more important than maintaining their personal essences of self-
righteousness, and thus they willingly sacrifice themselves for that goal.  Imperfect examples 
shown above illustrate the difficulties of a truly self-sacrificing hero, but ultimately, these 
individuals do exist, and the problem is not that they are truly villains, but that society perceives 
them as such. 
 The epitome of the self-sacrificing hero we have outlined in this essay is a self-aware 
individual who transforms the world around him for the better because of his self-perceived moral 
obligation towards others.  This individual defies the hegemonies that imprison the 
consciousnesses of others in society by unveiling the existence and malignancy of those 
hegemonies to the individuals they imprison.  At the risk—even certainty—of losing himself, this 
hero who has transcended the realm of normal understanding reenters the world to save those who 
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are still ignorant.  This self-sacrificing hero is the freed prisoner from Plato‟s Allegory of the Cave.  
Enlightened by the realization that the world is more than shadows on the wall, this autonomous 
individual frees his fellow prisoners to show them what reality truly is, and is summarily executed 
for defying those other prisoners‟ sensibilities.  Modern society still plays the part of those 
ignorant prisoners—chastising those who would dare to say society is imperfect for the sake of 
promoting its goodness—and the time has come to change. 
 Occasionally, self-sacrificing heroes of the past are regarded as people who were „ahead of 
their time,‟ such as Voltaire, whose pessimistic criticism of the French system of government did 
not correspond with optimistic views of his time, and thus he was subsequently imprisoned and 
exiled.
63
  Will our modern society be perceived in the future as we today perceive the society of 
18
th
 century France? How many brilliant minds do we suppress in favor of solidarity over 
betterment of ourselves? The time has come to cease suppressing the voice of the enlightened one 
and to perceive morally-centered autonomous individuals for what they truly are.  The harbingers 
of change are not the villainous demons of uncertainty that society frequently portrays them as; 
rather, they are self-sacrificing heroes who aid the innovation of the world today in order to better 
the world of tomorrow.  
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